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I. PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION'
While living in Spain in 1995 as a visiting scholar at the University of
Seville researching comparative environmental regulation, I casually asked my
friend and colleague Professor Jesus Jordano Fraga why no one talked about
Franco or the Civil War.2 He replied (in essence) that it was a painful and divi-
sive subject and that people wanted to forget pain and avoid division. It was
twenty years after Franco's death. Democracy was new and invigorating, and
prosperity had increased dramatically in those two decades. Spain had rejoined
Europe. Life was good. Why rock the boat?
Although the average Spaniard of the mid-1990s refused to discuss the
Civil War or Franco, and while critical media denounced this "collective amne-
sia," numerous authors and filmmakers were producing works based on these
publicly-avoided themes.3 This contrast struck respected intellectual Paloma
Aguilar as a paradox. However, it seems no paradox that society's critics and
creative forces would confront suppressed discontents that the public and politi-
cal elites avoided.
Besides my 1994-95 sabbatical research focus on Spanish environmen-
tal issues, it happened that I also taught international human rights. So when
British authorities detained General Augusto Pinochet three years later in 1998
for crimes against humanity committed in Chile, the news caught my attention.
I I am grateful for the prior scholarship of Paloma Aguilar, whose work on the "Pact of For-
getting" was groundbreaking and definitive; of Christina Palomares for her work on democratic
transition in Spain; and of Naomi Roht-Arriaza for her work on the "Pinochet Effect."
2 I now realize that the same question struck Paloma Aguilar, who wrote the following in
1996:
My interest was initially aroused by the contradictory impressions that I
formed from reading the abundant literature which exists regarding the Transi-
tion as well as numerous pieces from the daily press. From my reading of the
former I sensed the existence of a deliberate silence regarding the recent past
which, nevertheless, seemed to underlie the most important decision-making
processes of that period. The obsession with peace and stability, the particular
caution regarding issues relating to public order, the systematic avoidance of
conflictual issues . . . led me to focus . . . on the collective memory of the
Spanish people ....
PALOMA AGUILAR, MEMORY AND AMNESIA: THE ROLE OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR IN THE
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY xviii (Mark Oakley trans., 2002) (emphasis added). See also Daniel
Hannan, Lorca's Skeleton Speaks ofa New Spain, THE TELEGRAPH (UK), Aug. 29, 2009, available
at www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/6111468/Lorcas-skeleton-speaks-of-a-new-
Spain.html.
3 Sebastiaan Faber, The Price ofPeace: Historical Memory in Post-Franco Spain, a Review-
Article, 58 Revista Hispinica Moderna 205, 206 (2005) (discussing the growth in Spanish media
treating the topic of memory).
4 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at xix.
[Vol. 114826
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That Spanish judges requested Pinochet's detention to seek the general's extra-
dition for trial in Spain piqued my interest further. I was sure that this strange
and marvelous legal action somehow shed light on my brief discussion with
Jesus three years earlier. More was emerging with this news than "merely" a
historic human rights and legal struggle testing the controversial doctrine of
universal jurisdiction. The Pinochet prosecution also appeared to offer a meta-
phor for the legal process that never had been pursued against Franco,5 a stand-
in for a public voicing by Franco's victims. 6 A pact offorgetting tacitly "negoti-
ated" in the late 1970s to facilitate Spain's transition to democracy had silenced
that voice.7
Political analysts, not legislators, named the Pact of Forgetting (Pacto
de Olvido)-that is, there is no formal written agreement by that name.8 It was
an implied understanding, a political deal made after Franco's death in 1975,
under which Spanish conservatives and the military acquiesced to democracy,
while liberals and leftists agreed to forgo any accounting for the crimes of the
Franco regime.9 The elites across the Spanish political spectrum (except at the
insignificant extremes) felt that such a trade-off was required to ensure civil
peace.' 0 Some critics assert that "Pact of Silence" (Pacto de Silencio) describes
this unwritten social contract better than "Pact of Forgetting," since the wrongs
of the Francoists were not forgotten, but only repressed from public discourse."
Both designations appear in scholarly and popular literature. In any event, the
silence of my Spanish colleagues in 1994-95, as explained.by my friend Jesus,
reflected this society-wide compact.
Spain's transition to democracy and its assertion of universal jurisdic-
tion over human rights abusers reflect, at the national level, themes visible in the
global human rights picture in the decades bordering the turn of the millennium.
Spain successfully achieved its democratic transition in the 1970s and 1980s
Metaphor and irony, particularly regarding the themes of this Article, surrounded Pinochet's
only previous trip to Europe. In 1975, he flew to Spain for Franco's funeral, the only head-of-state
to so honor the dead dictator. The apparently ungrateful transitional government gave him forty-
eight hours to depart the country. NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2005).
6 Id. at 1. See also Stanley Meisler, Spain Forgets Franco, But Not Pinochet, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1998, at 2, available at articles.latimes.com/1998/dec/06/opinion/op-51 109.
Judge Baltazar Garzon, chief Spanish prosecutor in the Pinochet extradition, initially denied that
any Franco metaphor was implicit in the Spanish cases against former Latin dictators.
7 Madeleine Davis, Is Spain Recovering its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido, 27 Hum.
Rts. Q. 858, 863-64 (2005). See also PAUL PRESTON, THE POLITICS OF REVENGE: FASCISM AND THE
MILITARY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY SPAIN 33 (1995).
8 OMAR G. ENCARNACION, SPANISH POLITICS: DEMOCRACY AFTER DICTATORSHIP 2 (2008).
9 PRESTON, supra note 7, at 33 (discussing the conflict between a desire for revenge and the
fear of another civil war as the basis for the unspoken pact of forgetting). See also ENCARNACION,
supra note 8, at 2.
10 PRESTON, supra note 7, at 33.
1 Faber, supra note 3, at 205.
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under a public amnesia toward the dictatorship it was leaving behind. Yet its
prosecuting judges led the world in the 1990s and 2000s in promoting the use of
universal jurisdiction to secure justice for human rights victims. These two ac-
complishments seemed ethically discordant: Spain's forgetfulness toward Fran-
co's crimes did not jive with its leading role in the movement toward enforce-
ment of international criminal law against deposed tyrants. However, progres-
sive Spanish lawyers have purposely, though perhaps stealthily, interwoven
these two threads.
Manuel Fraga Iribarnel 2 and Baltazar Garzon have rarely, if ever, spo-
ken to each other.13 The dialogue I created for them here never really occurred.
But to add some biographical narrative to my analysis, I highlight elements in
the careers of these two "transition men," one of the political right and one of
the left, both lawyers and professors, both controversial, and both fascinating
players in Spain's democratic transition. Fraga began his career a generation
before Garzon. The former was a chief architect of the Proto-transition that oc-
curred in the final decade and a half of Francoist rule.14 The latter became
known at the millenium's turn as the international legal profession's most visi-
ble advocate of universal jurisdiction.15 Ironically, he now finds himself a de-
fendant in Spanish court for purportedly overstepping the prohibitions of
Spain's 1976 Amnesty Law by initiating an investigation of Francoist crimes.
The Pinochet case debuted on the international political stage when
British police arrested the former dictator prior to departing England after medi-
cal treatment in 1998." The significance of Spanish prosecutors initiating this
prosecution (and a number of similar ones within a few years) underlies a major
theme of this paper-dealing by indirection with the unresolved moral legacy of
Francoism. Pinochet was a metaphor for Franco. Therefore, this Article exam-
ines how universal jurisdiction rose and flourished in Spain for about a decade,
changing Spanish politics and international law profoundly.
12 For readers unfamiliar with Spanish name order, please note that where an individual has
two family names (as in Manuel Fraga Iribarne) the former is usually the paternal one, the latter
the maternal, and simple identity is usually given by the paternal name only, hence Sr. Fraga.
13 Research in English-language sources reveals no interactions between these two prominent
Spaniards. However, given their decades of public service, albeit in opposing political camps, one
would suspect they were in the same room at the same time on occasion. Maybe they talked.
14 CHRISTINA PALOMARES, THE QUEST FOR SURVIVAL AFTER FRANCO: MODERATE FRANCOISM
AND THE SLOW JOURNEY TO THE POLLS, 1964-1977, at 4 (2004).
15 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 216-17.
16 See infra Part IX.
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Further, this Article observes the decline, especially in Spain, of pure
universal jurisdiction in national tribunals. Ironically, this waning occurred
shortly after the Spanish Constitutional Court's 2005 ruling validating precisely
such pure universality-based judicial competence.' 8 The decline reflects the
consequences of a breach in the Pact of Forgetting facilitated by the election of
President Zapatero, by the increased newly confident activism of families vic-
timized under Franco, and by legislation repudiating Franco's coup and dictator-
ship.19 This waning also reflects the diminished need for national assertions of
universal jurisdiction as international human rights tribunals (e.g., the Interna-
tional Criminal Court) mature.
We end at the Valley of the Fallen, an immense cave-basilica-
mausoleum, a monumental tribute by Franco to himself and to the bloody Civil
War victory by one half of Spain over the other half. The nation's ambivalence
regarding how now to deal with this grand project of granite, hubris, and forced
labor reflects the uncertainty and compromise that have characterized the Span-
ish transition-and perhaps which ironically have made peaceful democratic
change possible.
In 1976, Spain chose to forget because it remembered all too well. Now
that it has secured democracy without spilled blood, it can remember again.
II. TRANSITION MEN: FANTASY DIALOGUE 20
Manuel Fraga (F): Your prosecutions are publicity stunts.
You confuse politics and law. You seek judgments from courts
that can only be made by history. And you ignore sovereign
rights.2 1
IS See Guatemala Genocide Case, S.T.S., Sept. 9, 2005 (Boletin Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.],
No. 258, p. 45), available at
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultaslbasesdatos/doc.php?coleccion-c&id=SENTENCIA-2005-
0237.
19 Carolyn P. Boyd, The Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain, in 617 THE
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 133, 143 (Martin 0.
Heisler ed., 2008) (discussing condemnation of Francoist coup by Cortes Commission on Foreign
Affairs). See also Davis, supra note 7, at 859.
20 DISCLAIMER: This dialogue and the one in Part Six are fictional, literary devices intended
to further the academic purposes of this Article. The public men portrayed here never spoke these
words. Nor can I claim with certainty that they even thought the thoughts that the words imply.
Like much historical fiction, these dialogues aim to throw light on the actions taken by these men
in matters of public consequence. I have tried to make that light illuminating, not glaring. Like
political cartoons, these dialogues emphasize isolated aspects of the actions and characters of
complex persons. My sketches might be incomplete like those cartoons, not purporting to be bio-
graphically comprehensive.
21 Why Fraga and Garzon? Each has led a public life whose acts constituted landmarks in
Spain's transition. They represent two sides of the present Spanish political spectrum, Fraga on
8292012]
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Baltasar Garzon (G): I respect sovereignty. But it is not abso-
lute. Sovereignty cannot excuse the violation of the most basic
universal legal norms. When powerful officials torture or insti-
gate genocide, they wrong not only the victim, but also all hu-
mankind. The concept "crime against humanity" denotes pre-
cisely this. And, as you should know as a former law professor,
the prosecution of crime is the province of law, not politics.
F: Crimes against humanity! What nonsense! A false concept
fabricated by socialists and fools.
G: The judges and lawyers at Nuremberg were no fools, and
only the Soviet representatives were socialists. The British,
French, and Americans were respected members of the Western
legal establishment and among its finest legal minds. Their gov-
ernments' decision to try the Nazis for crimes against humanity,
rather than summarily lining them up against a wall and shoot-
ing, elevated law over brute power. I understand, though, how a
seminal precedent established by the conviction of Nazi crimi-
nals creates unease in a gentleman like you who so faithfully
served a Spanish dictator installed by those same Nazis.
F: You leftists disrespect the truth, as you do most other tradi-
tional values. Franco led a crusade at the demand of a Spanish
nation reclaiming its patrimony from the threat of world Com-
munism. It is true that certain states supported our cause-
Germany among them-but Stalin aided the other side. No Nazi
installed the Generalissimo. The Spanish people did that.
the right and Garzon on the left. Their careers have overlapped in history, but they come from
successive generations. Fraga rose to prominence in the 1960s as a new young voice within the
Franco government. From the late 1950s until Franco's death, he argued for a gradual opening of
the repressive regime. Garzon was a child, then a student, during those twenty years and mounted
the political stage only after the new democracy had been established by the 1978 Constitution.
They have shared that stage for most of the last three decades. The continuous rise of Garzon's
career has coincided with the long maturity and the eventual decline of Fraga's.
Fraga and Garzon both studied law. They have practiced it, taught it, interpreted it, and created
it-as attorneys, professors, legislators, and bureaucrats. They understand the law's power and
have used it for justice (and, some argue, for injustice). As Franco's Minister of Information and
Tourism, Fraga midwifed the 1966 Press Law that opened up the Spanish media to a degree un-
precedented since the Civil War. However, he also supervised repressive action against media that
he felt had overstepped the bounds of that statute. PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 91-94. By his
creative prosecutions under Spain's universal jurisdiction statute, Garzon prompted ground-
breaking development of international human rights doctrine, most notably through the House of
Lords decision in the Pinochet case. R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), [2000] 1 AC 147, [1999] 2 All ER 97, [1999] 2 WLR 827, 1999 WL
250052 (hereinafter Pinochet No. 3).
830 [Vol. 114
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G: And tens of thousands of Moroccan mercenaries.
F: So was it the Moors or was it the Nazis? Truth is a flexible
thing with you. You illustrate why the past should be left to his-
torians. We can all shape a story to our liking, picking this fact,
ignoring that one. So what if the General did use the loyal For-
eign Legion in the initial rising on 18 July? A mere tactic. And
a successful one in furtherance of a just cause. But more im-
portantly, arguing about these things at this moment serves no
good purpose. It just reopens wounds on both sides. With no
chance of agreement on eternally disputed facts, such argument
offers no prospect of reconciliation. Let the fallen lie in peace.
G: The "fallen"! Hypocritical rhetoric. Franco built his "Valley
of the Fallen" with slave labor-Republican political prison-
ers-as an obscene memorial to himself. The worst sort of fas-
cist monumentalism! Stalin or Hitler could have done no better.
F: Liberals, socialists, atheists-you love to mock the sacred.
Can't you even let the dead have their honor without your
sneers? The monument at the "Valley of the Fallen" honors all
those Spaniards who sacrificed their lives for their beliefs be-
tween 1936 and 1939. Have you no respect?
G: The Valley of the Fallen was built with the bone and blood
of enslaved Republican prisoners to honor only fallen National-
ists, and most particularly Franco himself who lies in front of
the altar of the monstrous basilica. Yet Falangist 22 apologists
like you would have us believe that that monstrosity of a tomb
honors all Spanish Civil War dead! A convenient revision now
that the prevailing wind blows democratic! Today the trium-
phalism of the 1940s is your embarrassment. The victors wish
the victims to forgive and forget. The robber offers the robbed a
hand of peace, but no return of treasure and no regret.
22 Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of 1920s Spanish dictator Miguel and right-wing martyr
(executed by the Republican government during the Civil War) founded the Falange in 1933.
ANTONY BEEVOR, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 42 (Penguin Books 2001). The Falange Espanola was
more-or-less the Spanish version of a fascist party. Franco adopted the party as his own and incor-
porated it into his broader Nationalist "Movement." With the establishment of his Movement,
Franco purported to outlaw political parties. See ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 22. However, the
Falange continued its influence and, in a sense, its existence within the regime. While claiming to
have created a state without political parties, Spain under Franco was effectively a one-party state.
Gunther et al. argue that Spain is more properly regarded as a "no-party" state, despite the 1958
incorporation of the Falange into Franco's Movimientio Nacional. RICHARD GUNTHER ET AL.,
DEMOCRACY IN MODERN SPAIN 65-66 (2004).
2012] 83 1
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F: I have no regret. I owe no one an apology. I never was a Fa-
langist, let alone a Fascist. In fact, I helped dampen the so-
called triumphalism you condemn and open the door to progress
and democracy. Not that there was anything wrong with cele-
brating our triumph over anarchy and atheism.
G: The triumph of one half of Spain over the other half!
F: If I may complete my thought.... By 1960 it made sense to
focus on the peace and stability that General Franco brought to
Spain, rather than on his military victory.
G: A convenient shift in emphasis. Particularly for audiences in
Paris, London, and New York who remembered their recent war
against fascism quite well.
F: We cared about economic development and social harmony
in our country, not about opinion abroad.
G: Who is "we"? Some reformist group of fascists?
F: You try to bait me with your simplistic and inaccurate slan-
der of "fascist." I've heard that before and learned to ignore this
calumny. But I will answer the substance of your question.
G: Please.
F: We were young reformers in the 1950s and '60s. Spain
needed to modernize and to feed its people. General Franco had
given us the peace and unity necessary to do this. Tourism and
foreign investment could supplement national economic renew-
al. We did not doubt the heroism of the Nationalist triumph, but
it was time to look forward. Our reformist line made the transi-
tion to democracy possible.
G: Really, this is too much! Your "reformist line" sought to
preserve Franco's regime and his so-called Movement-a close
cousin to the Nazi Party and Italian Fascism-not to promote
democracy.
F: I served during the final two decades of the General's forty-
year rule. During that time, we moved Spain's economy from
third-world status to a high stage of development. Our citizens
learned to work for their common advancement and not waste
energy on partisan conflict. We fostered a respect for social
consensus that allowed for the transition of the late 1970s.
832 [Vol. 114
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G: Absurd revisionism! As Information Minister in the '60s
you successfully promoted legislation that severely restricted
freedom of expression. You condemned the 1962 Munich meet-
ing of moderate Spanish reformers and democrats. 2 3 Your gov-
ernment continued to suppress dissent and trample on liberties
right until Franco's death. You were never part of a vanguard
for democratic transition. You helped lead the rear guard
against it.
F: The legislation I created in 1966 opened the press. It certain-
24ly did not restrict it-it was a crucial step toward democracy.
G: You've learned the rhetoric of democratic transition, but
you are not a democrat. You speak for only half of Spain. You
value only half of Spain-the authoritarian, the centralist, the
economic elite, the Catholic. Your notion of reconciliation dur-
ing the last two decades of Francoism-when you yourself
wielded authority-was not true reconciliation. It was submis-
sion. Submission by the libertarian, by the regionalist, by the
worker, by the secularist. You won. They lost. You murdered
and stole and made peace with your boot on their neck. You
stole their children and gave them to Francoist families.25 Such
23 The June 5-8, 1962, Munich Gathering was between moderate oppositional elements, both
from within Spain and from the exile community. The participants discussed the future of Spain in
addition to the incorporation of Spain in the European Community. AGUILAR, supra note 2, at
102-10.
24 Ley de prensa e imprenta [Spanish Press Law], (B.O.E. 1966, 67) (Spain). Palomares quotes
Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez regarding the two edges of Fraga's Press Law, the latter asserting:
"[T]he Press Law of 1966 was the most important step taken towards the 'de-
mocratization' of institutions and of the habits of Spanish public life . . . It
may sound strange perhaps . . . that I say this when it is notorious that
Cuadernos para el Dialogo has many scratches in its skin [caused by] some of
the thorns hidden under this law . . . But, it is no less true [to say] that, under
the protection of this law, new newspapers, new magazines and new book se-
ries have emerged in our homeland [which have lead to] a new climate for in-
formation, criticism and promotion of collective dialogue."
PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 39.
Palomares herself (no right-winger) goes on to observe, "Fraga's Law constituted an irreversible
step towards modernization, which undoubtedly contributed to the weakening of the Francoist
foundations." Id.
25 Christine Toomey, Spain's Stolen Children, THE TIMES (UK), Mar. 1, 2009, available at
www.christinetoomey.com/pdfs/Spains stolenchildren.pdf. Franco's regime took thousands of
children from imprisoned or executed Republican parents and, erasing their identities, gave them
to Nationalist families. A number of survivors of such dismembered families have attempted
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were your "traditional values." And now that history has re-
versed your triumph, through the ineluctable progress of Euro-
pean democracy, you try to give your old domination a new
coat of paint and call it peace and the door to change.
F: We did open the door to democratic change by our policies
in the '50s, '60s, and '70s.
G: A rather long time just to open a door.
F: Learn courtesy, please. I listened to your oration. We could
only open that door if we suppressed that consciousness of two
Spains. No more authoritarian against anarchist. No more cen-
tralist against regionalist. No more peasant and worker against
landowner and industrialist. No more priest against secularist.
Finished with those old Manichaean rivalries, we created a new
Spain which could progress united toward democratic govern-
ance. It could not so progress if every generation or two, our na-
tion tore itself apart in some kind of Hegelian Marxist dialectic.
G: But admit that your version of unity was to eliminate dis-
sent. It did not permit social, humanist, and decentralist voices
to harmonize with your National Movement.
F: Those voices seem to have survived quite well. Perhaps too
well. Now we have men marrying men and our 1936 Crusade
declared a crime by parliament-while real crime increases ev-
ery day, not apparently concerning your Socialist government.
For someone who squats upon such high moral ground, you
have very little regard for the difference between right and
wrong. Society cannot survive without a firm set of values that
articulates and enforces what is good and proper.
G: We agree that the distinction between right and wrong un-
derlies civilization. I do differ from you by finding mass murder
a greater breach against decency than gay marriage.
F: And what mass murderers have you caught today?
G: Scilingo and Cavallo, major military torturers and murder-
ers from Argentina. We came close with Rios-Montt from Gua-
temala and established excellent precedent at the Constitutional
834 [Vol. 114
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Tribunal by his prosecution.26 And we would have had Pinochet
had the British government not found his supposedly failing
health an obstacle to extradition.
F: Thank God for some common sense.
G: More likely, political cowardice. Britain's courts were less
timid than its government. The House of Lords upheld our right
to prosecute Pinochet for crimes against humanity, reaffirming
the Nuremberg precedent that no doctrine of immunity-
sovereign, head of state, or whatever-shields the perpetrators
of torture and genocide. Its decision advanced the international
rule of law through universal jurisdiction.
F: Universal nonsense! I have lectured at law. No such jurisdic-
tion exists except in the minds of zealots and naive idealistic
fools who blindly follow them.
G: Furthermore, men like Pinochet and Rios-Montt, even if
they have avoided Spanish prison, will live less easily and trav-
el less freely. Some have been prosecuted in their own countries
only after our international investigations gave local judges the
courage to resist intimidation by lingering military bosses.
F: But who made you God? Why should you decide that a
president from Chile or a general from Guatemala should stand
trial, particularly outside their home countries? And not even in
an international tribunal-that would be bad enough. But you
have the nerve to bring them before a local Spanish court. And
you left-wingers constantly complain about neocolonialism!
What hypocrisy.
G: I am not a politician. I am a lawyer. I don't care in my in-
vestigations about right-wing or left-wing-only right and
wrong. I seek no political power-just to change the world one
27
case at a time.
26 Guatemala Genocide Case, S.T.S., Sept. 9, 2005 (Boletin Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.], No.
258, p. 45), available at
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/basesdatos/doc.php?coleccion-tc&id=SENTENCIA-2005-
0237 (upholding universal jurisdiction in Spain).
27 Lola Galin, The Judge Who Never Rests, EL PAIS (ENGLISH), Oct. 30, 2008, at 4, available
at 2008 WLNR 20647774.
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F: When I was your age, I had the world in my hands, and I




F: I had worked for reform for years. With success. Billions of
tourist dollars and pounds and deutschmarks. Millions of tour-
ists. A free press. An intellectual blossoming. All with stability.
And respect. Not the degeneracy we see today. Aperturistas?28 I
was the Aperturista. I created those openings. And I could have
guided Spain through those openings to a stable democracy, one
that did not rupture with our great national heritage. But the
King chose a nobody-a fool. 29
G: Suarez was no fool. And Don Carlos helped create and then
saved our new democracy. The King was a good captain and
Suarez an excellent pilot. Particularly after Arias30 had shown
himself to be an obstructionist. When Juan Carlos chose him,
Suarez had already done good work at national television pre-
paring the country for establishment of the constitutional mon-
archy. And he had functioned competently in other posts.
F: Competent? Ordinary!
G: You are a bit of an elitist.
F: Of course! But so are you. Did you become a judge of the
Audiencia by failing examinations? Or by striking for a shorter
workweek? You bourgeois leftists are all alike.
I saw it in England, as well.3 1 You get degrees with honors from
Oxford or Harvard or Madrid Computense and then spout the
virtues of leveling us all to mediocrity.
28 Reformists within the latter stages of the Franco regime were known as "aperturistas"-
those favoring a gradual opening of society. PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 1.
29 Suarez was certainly less well-known than Fraga, a fact that may have actually played to his
advantage. ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 33-34 (describing King Juan Carlos as choosing "his
own man" from within Franco's regime).
30 Carlos Arias Navarro was the last of Franco's prime ministers, initially retained in that post
by the new King Juan Carlos after Franco's death in November 1975.
3' Fraga was ambassador to the United Kingdom. PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 111-15.
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G: Equality is not mediocrity. It is unbiased and meaningful
access to justice and to the means of survival. Your purportedly
Spanish values excused crimes against those not accepting such
pseudo-values.
F: But it is you, my friend, who is the criminal.
G: How?
F: You have violated your sacred judicial trust in a number of
ways. But your most egregious crime has been to violate the
Law of Amnesty 3 2 so fundamental to our present democracy.
You who are so vocal in purporting to promote that democracy!
But your actions do not support your words. Typical leftist hy-
pocrisy.
G: That Law of Amnesty was negotiated more than thirty years
ago under military threat.
F: Nonsense, there was no military threat.
G: Of course there was. The generals were not about to give up
their privileged positions and risk prison. Nor were your friends
in the "Bunker," the Francoist elite.
F: Sophistry and slander! I know that you are somewhat intel-
ligent and modestly well-informed. Therefore, only dishonesty
can explain that you link me to the so-called Bunker. I was no
friend to the intransigent old men within the old regime who re-
sisted all progress. You know that for two decades I fought
against them, often to the detriment of my career.3 3 But my be-
havior is not the topic here. You broke the law. 34 Even more se-
32 Ley de Amnistia [Amnesty Law] (B.O.E. 1977, 248) (Spain), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1977/10/17/pdfs/A22765-22766.pdf.
33 Although Fraga has since become identified with conservative Spanish politics, he (claims
to have) decided during his service in Franco's regime to serve as an "instrument for political
openness." PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 88-89 (internal quotes omitted).
34 Anita Brooks, Baltasar Garzon Vowed to See Spain's Fascists in Court. But Not This Way,
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riously, you broke the social contract that for three decades has
prevented civil rupture and bloody strife.s
G: Now you speak of the unwritten Pact of Forgetting, as well
as the formal Amnesty Law of 1977?
F: They are one.
G: No, they are distinct.
F: They are one, and you have been indicted for their breach.
G: No, they are distinct, and that's just the point. The so-
called36 Pact of Forgetting-I prefer "Pact of Silence"-was a
political deal made by political elites just after Franco's death to
enable a peaceful transition without military interference. In ex-
change, moderate and left democrats would accept a monarchy
and forgo a national accounting for Franco's repression and vio-
lence. I admit ignoring only that non-legal pact.
F: You admit it? You admit opening old wounds? That guilt is
even greater than your legal culpability. You would tear the so-
cial fabric.
G: I would require men like you to answer for your service un-
der one of the twentieth century's worst tyrants. Besides, I did
not open those old wounds. They were already bleeding. You
know that before I began my investigation, groups of concerned
families and friends were already digging up mass graves left
by your Caudillo'S 37 death squads. 3 8 They had never agreed to
your Pact of Silence and were not bound by it.
F: You talk of tyrants! Franco saved us from Stalin, the great-
est tyrant in memory. Perhaps thousands died for Spain-on
both sides-but Stalin butchered millions. And Stalin was the
3 Christine Spolar, Tortuous path to Spain's painful past: Crusadingjudge's exit from probe
of Civil War-era mass graves may leave truth in the ground, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 19, 2008, at
6, available at 2008 WLNR 22062470.
36 See the discussion of the designation, "Forgetting" or "Silence," supra Part I.
37 "Caudillo" (Leader) was the Nationalists' title of reverence and obedience for Franco, anal-
ogous to "Der Ftlhrer" Hitler in Nazi Germany or "Il Duce" for Mussolini in Fascist Italy.
AGUILAR, supra note 2, at xi. All three titles might be used with some irony by non-admirers.
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hero who directed your Republican cause. His tanks, his air-
planes, his secret police!
G: I have no love or nostalgia for the Soviets. But the Republic
only turned to Stalin after Franco and his fellow plotters invad-
ed our homeland from Morocco with foreign troops, Moors and
legionnaires, flown across the Gibraltar straits in German planes
by Nazi pilots. And even then, the liberal and democratic Re-
public would have preferred assistance from America, Britain,
and France-sister democracies-but it was not forthcoming.
Right-wing and Vatican elements in those countries saw to that.
As Hitler and Mussolini continued to provide weapons and men
to the invaders, the LoyalistS3 9 had no one but the Soviets to
support their just struggle. 40 1 condemn the way that the Repub-
lican government was hijacked by the communists as the war
dragged on, but look to London and Washington and Paris for
that guilt-not to mention Rome and Berlin.
F: And what about the 1977 Amnesty Statute? You represent
yourself as a man of the law! Yet you trample on it when that
suits you.
G: No national statute can grant immunity for crimes against
humanity. That is settled international law, as well as the law of
Spain. The 1977 Amnesty is effective, but must be interpreted
consistently with jus cogens.4 1 Don Manuel, you were a law
professor. You understand this basic rule of legal interpretation.
F: You open a Pandora's box when you accuse Franco of
crimes against humanity. Your beloved Republic murdered, tor-
tured, raped, and burned. Better you should continue forgetting
if you don't care to revive memories of left-wing crimes.
G: That is the "myth of the two devils." And indeed it is a
myth.
F: You deny that Republicans committed atrocities?
39 "Loyalist" was another term for "Republican," those loyally supporting the elected govern-
ment against the Franco-led rebellion.
40 ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 21.
41 Jus cogens is an overriding norm of international law (such as the prohibition against slav-
ery) that may never be violated, even by otherwise-valid treaty or consensual practice.
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G: It was a civil war! Of course crimes were committed on
both sides. But that does not make the guilty equal. Francoists
perpetrated abuses that were more systemic, more brutal, and
more numerous than those of the Republicans. Rape, terror, tor-
ture, and execution without trial were so common as National-
ists conquered new territory, they could only have been official
Nationalist policy. In the Republic, such abuses were the excep-
tion and never official policy.
F: Republicans burned churches, raped nuns, murdered priests,
and executed Nationalists without trial. Such outrages were too
frequent to not be sponsored. Furthermore, historical reports
consistently describe the torture and murder by the Republican
secret police.
G: There is no evidence of raped nuns-a nasty and cynical
blood-libel to inflame the worst in people.42 Priests died as part
of the civil strife wherein the Church inexcusably sided with
fascism. Churches burned in the same context. But neither
crime was promoted by the government. As to the secret police,
it was only after the Soviets gained influence in a Republican
government abandoned by the Western democracies and subject
to German and Italian assault on behalf of Franco that security
abuses occurred regularly-often against fellow Republicans
unwilling to toady to Stalin's puppets.
F: So you accept that the communists controlled the Republic?
G: No. I only accept that they gained undue influence as the
Civil War progressed, with Hitler and Mussolini carrying Fran-
co while Britain, France, and the United States refused aid to
their fellow democracy. Unfortunately, only the Russians came
to the aid of the elected Republican government.
F: Your elected government was tearing Spain in two-no, into
many little pieces.
G: It was elected, and Franco's coup was illegal. From that il-
legality flowed all the other crimes and slaughter of the Civil
War. Add to that the abuses by the victors-mass arrests, tor-
ture, disappearances, executions, stolen children-in the years
that followed.
42 Beevor, supra note 22, at 70 (stating that the 1946 Nationalist indictment of Republicans for
Civil War-era crimes offers no evidence in support of these allegations).
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F: Had the Republic won, it would have done the same, with
Stalin's assistance.
G: We don't know that-we only know that Franco did com-
mit these crimes.
F: Not crime-purification and unification. Without the Cau-
dillo's crusade, Spain would not exist today.43
III. HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE MYTH OF THE Two DEVILS
Spaniards take human rights seriously-more so than almost any other
Europeans. Surveys have shown this attitude." (Maybe this reflects Spaniards'
desire to once again be Europeans.).45 Decades of Francoism make such a hu-
man-rights consciousness perhaps surprising, perhaps expected. Surprising-
that a populace conditioned over forty years to passive apolitical acquiescence
should suddenly demonstrate libertarian assertiveness; expected-that a popu-
lace repressed for forty years would naturally rebound to embrace its freedom.
Observers of Spain note the anarchic strain in the national character.4 6 They also
note an authoritarian strain.4 7 Possibly, at last, these strands have interwoven in
a state that is both secure and libertarian.
A. "Europe Stops at the Pyrenees"
For centuries, Spain sat at the political and cultural, as well as the geo-
graphic, periphery of Europe (or, at least, that was the common wisdom).48
Spain did experience the Renaissance. In fact, along with a few other nations,
Spain led Europe in the artistic and exploratory achievements of that era. But it
43 Manuel Fraga Iribarne died on January 15, 2012, as this manuscript was in its final editing.
Associated Press, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Aide of Franco and Spain Political Force, Dies at 89,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/16/world/europe/manuel-fraga-
iribarne-aide-of-franco-dies-at-89.html? r-l. His nephew and my friend Prof. Jesus Jordano
Fraga informed me of Fraga's passing by an e-mail on February 4, 2012.
4 Eurobarometer 66: Public Opinion in the European Union, Eur. Commission, Autumn
2006, at 8, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_es-en.pdf (stat-
ing that fifty-five percent of Spaniards named "peace" as the most important value, and an addi-
tional forty-one percent named "human rights" as the most important value).
45 For decades under Franco and perhaps centuries before that, Spain suffered from an under-
developed economy and lack of personal freedoms compared to its Western European neighbors.
46 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 11 (noting that the political climate in pre-Civil War Spain made
anarchy the most popular political philosophy among the Spanish working class).
47 Id. Beevor sees three historic axes of division in Spain: right-left (including class), authori-
tarian-libertarian, and regional-centrist. One might also add religious-secular or include it under
the right-left division.
48 See, e.g., Helen Graham, Spain and Europe: The View from the Periphery, 35 THE HIST. J.
969 (1992) (book review).
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lost its cultural and political centrality through misguided policies: an ultimately
stultifying (albeit initially energetic) counter-reformation, the expulsion of Jews
and Moslems, and an economy in the sixteenth century that, while appearing to
thrive, in fact, lived off colonial loot to the detriment of real economic develop-
ment.49
Consequently, by the time the Enlightenment burst onto prospering
France and England, Spain had become a bejeweled shell of a power, closed to
the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu. Talleyrand summarized this decline when
he Frenchly observed, "Europe stops at the Pyrenees."50 Regardless of whether
the attribution is accurate," his apocryphal remark has been so often repeated,
as to become a common truism for those describing Spain's isolation from
mainstream Europe in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 5 2 Nei-
ther the 1689 English Bill of Rights, nor the 1789 French Declaration of the
Rights of Man would find their equivalent in Spain prior to the 1978 Constitu-
tion.53
While the nineteenth century saw a brief flirtation with liberalization
and modernization (including a brief First Republic), Spain remained politically
and socially reactionary, as well as economically backward, into the twentieth
century.54 The poor were desperately poor, and the small liberal intellectual sub-
class was desperately alienated. The repressive proto-fascist dictatorship of Mi-
guel Primo de Rivera in the late 1920s increased the polarization between the
favored and the disfavored.
49 SIMON BARTON, A HISTORY OF SPAIN xvi, 101-02 (2009); RICHARD HERR, AN HISTORICAL
ESSAY ON MODERN SPAIN 39 (1971); HAROLD LIVERMORE, A HISTORY OF SPAIN (1958).
5o Of course, Talleyrand's government was not without blame for Spain's closure to the En-
lightenment. Napoleon's down-your-throat approach to bringing modernity to his southwestern
neighbor in 1808 cast those Spaniards who would have welcomed social liberalization into the
role of quislings to the French imperialists.
51 Another source claims Dumas said, "Africa begins at the Pyrenees." Carlos Fuentes, A
Glory Seldom Seen: Spain: A Nation Recovers Its Open, Democratic Tradition, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
3, 1986, http://articles.latimes.com/1986-08-03/opinion/op-1056_ldemocratic-tradition.
52 Steven Greenhouse, Spain, Losing Backward Image, Booms as It Lures Foreign Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/15/world/spain-losing-backward-
image-booms-as-it-lures-foreign-money.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
53 The 1812 Cadiz Constitution (drafted by Spanish democrats resisting the Napoleonic French
occupation in most of the rest of the country) was a political blip-on-the-screen that failed to
achieve the national staying power of the English, French, or American documents, although it did
inspire a few short-lived liberal governments in nineteenth-century Spain.
54 Limited enclaves of relative modernity, such as Barcelona, existed with little impact on the
Spanish heartland. Carlos Fuentes wrote of Spain's other tradition, a liberal one, in an article
where he spoke of the positive cultural and political contributions 200,000 refugees from Franco-
ism brought to Mexico in the 1930s and '40s. Fuentes, supra note 51.
5 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 23-24. Interestingly, certain national minority regions like Cata-
lonia (of which Barcelona was capital) and the Basque country were less underdeveloped, less
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In a country immemorially dominated by Church, King, and Seignor,
when one was anti-clerical or anti-monarchy, one often was so with a bitter ve-
hemence. So when a coalition of the alienated-republicans, socialists, com-
munists, anarchists, regionalists, and others-achieved resounding victory in
local elections in 1931 and forced the abdication of the ineffectual Alfonso XIII,
they were uncompromising in pushing through reforms that attacked the old
guard under their newly declared Second Republic. 6 Although their mandate
was democratic and legitimate, it was not overwhelming. The winners made
little effort to forge a national consensus as would be obsessively pursued by
transition democrats after Franco's death forty years later. The losers under the
Second Republic were powerful clerical, military, and landed elites, and the
Republic did little to court them or win over their sympathizers-monarchists,
traditionalist Catholics, and conservative landed peasants." One might argue
about numbers and foreign interference, but Franco's 1936 coup would not have
morphed into a successful revolution had there not been substantial support
throughout the country.
After Franco's invasion from Morocco in July 1936,59 Spain assumed a
significance to the European narrative that it had not held for centuries. Millions
of democrats and leftists sympathized with the besieged elected government,
and thousands volunteered to fight for its survival.6 0 However, governments of
the major democracies-particularly the United States, France, and Britain-
kept their distance and maintained military neutrality. 61 On the other hand, Fas-
cist Italy and Nazi Germany gave substantial military assistance to Franco.62
56 STANLEY G. PAYNE, 2 A HISTORY OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, 633, available at
http://libro.uca.edu/payne2/payne25.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
57 A number of commentators partly attribute problems of polarization under the 1930s Re-
public to legislative structure. First, the Cortes was unicameral, without the buffering influence of
a less-frequently changing upper chamber to dampen the political swings of the moment. Nor, of
course, was there the buffering influence of a broadly respected, politically neutral monarch-the
last one, Alfonso XIII, having failed in that role by supporting Primo de Rivera's dictatorship,
which had supported the continued impoverishment of the Spanish masses, especially the un-
landed peasants in the southwest. Second, the unicameral Cortes was elected on a winner-take-all
majoritarian scheme, lacking any proportional representation. Under such a scheme, the majority
could govern without consultation or compromise, opposition within the legislature was power-
less, and some viewpoints went totally unrepresented. The system promoted aggressive partisan
governance by winners and alienation of the losers from democracy. From 1930 until Franco's
coup d'Atat in 1936, the government swung from hard left to hard right to hard left again.
AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 173-8 1. See also BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 27-38.
58 See Payne, supra note 56, at 633.
5 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 51-52.
60 See Isaac Rosa, A Bellyful of Memory, EL PAIS (ENGLISH), July 13, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 12035822.
61 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 109-10.
62 Id. at 112-14.
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Franco's government promoted its own version of historical memory
during its first decade in power and promoted it without ambivalence.6 3 Domi-
nated by Falangist and right-wing, Catholic, quasi-fascist ideology, it portrayed
its Civil War victory as a successful crusade against godless communism. 4 Fur-
thermore, Franco's government painted this victory as contingent: without con-
tinued vigilance (that is, elimination of all opposition by whatever merciless
means) that triumph would be threatened. Franco's security and rump judicial
forces executed as many as 200,000 perceived enemies of state in the five years
following the Republican surrender.6 ' Franco entrenched his power by exagger-
ating the power of the National Enemy. He was not the first or last totalitarian to
employ this tactic. In any event, it was a tactic that remembered. To be sure,
Francoist memory was flawed, biased, and selective-but it was, in any case, a
policy that eschewed amnesia and reconciliation.
During these early years after the Civil War, primarily the 1940s, Fran-
co's defeated foes-those who survived-kept alive the counter-memory of
fascist violence and repression, during and after the war. And there is much evi-
66dence to support such counter-memory.
B. The Myth of the Two Devils
However, many western and Spanish observers of the Civil War and its
aftermath have chosen a false middle ground, whereon mushy memory set the
stage for subsequent amnesia. The myth goes like this:
Franco's forces did many bad things, but so did the Republi-
cans. Bad dictators, Hitler and Mussolini, aided Franco, but an
equally bad dictator, Stalin, helped the Republic. Franco's vic-
tory resulted in a quasi-fascist government, but only for the first
few years. The Republic would have been a Soviet-dominated
communist puppet had it survived. So, it's a moral wash-
devils on both sides.
And if it was a moral wash-if everyone was equally guilty-it makes some
sense to just forgive and forget. Especially forget.
63 Franco, for instance, frequently claimed that the Spanish Civil War cost one million lives in
order to emphasize the high cost of political and social strife. Other estimates place casualties
closer to 580,000. The great irony, of course, is that either figure-both entailing great costs to
humanity-would not have come about without Franco's invasion of Spain. ENCARNACION, supra
note 8, at 24.
6 See Paddy Woodworth, Group created by angry young students grew to become brutal,
popular force, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 21661201.
65 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 266.
66 Id. at 69-82 (describing a "relentless purging" of dissident forces by Nationalists).
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But, everyone was not equally guilty. Both sides indeed committed
crimes and moral transgressions. It would be surprising otherwise in a long con-
flict, especially a civil war. But abuses, even gross abuses, among enemies do
not signify moral equivalence. Britain and the United States illegally and inhu-
manely bombed civilian Dresden at the end of World War II, but this unjustifia-
ble act did not create a moral equivalence with the Nazis.67
So here is the sad scorecard.
The Republic did execute political prisoners, particularly in the early
months of the illegal rebellion against it.68 Some argument can be made that
those executed had in fact committed the crime of treason against a duly consti-
tuted government. But, even so, some of these executions were extra-judicial
with little or no due process. Here, we are probably talking about hundreds of,
or at most a few thousand, wrongful deaths. 6 9 When the Soviet Union obtained
influence over the Republican government (after Western democracies refused
to come to the aid of their fellow democracy facing a German- and Italian-
supported rebellion), government security agents perpetrated serious human
rights violations, mostly against fellow Republicans who challenged the rising
power of the communists.70 In some extreme cases, the Soviet-dominated Re-
publican secret police tortured and murdered political enemies, particularly an-
archists. There were also a number of church burnings and attacks on clergy,7 '
but not as official Republican policy. Tales of raped nuns and similar outrages
are almost uniformly unsubstantiated.72
Not a nice record by the Republicans (particularly where Communists
had gained dominance), but nowhere close to the depravity by Franco's forces
and his postwar government.
First, the Francoists started the carnage with an illegal coup d'etat
against a legitimate, democratically elected government. The rebels invaded
their own country, largely with non-Spanish troops stationed in Spanish Moroc-
co. 7 ' They were shuttled to Spain by Nazi warplanes, an illegal foreign interven-
67 Isaac Rosa condemns right-wing revisionist "relativism," implying the existence of Repub-
lican wrongs do not balance the systematic terror, murder, and torture under Franco. See Rosa,
supra note 60; see also ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 22 (quoting estimates of postwar execu-
tions at 40,000 to 200,000).
68 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 86-91.
69 Id. at 87 (the estimated death toll from the "red terror" is at 38,000).
70 DONALD RAYFIELD, STALIN AND HIS HANGMEN: THE TYRANT AND THOSE WHO KILLED FOR
HIM 362-63 (2004).
7 Cf STANLEY G. PAYNE, FRANCO AND HITLER: SPAIN, GERMANY, AND WORLD WAR II 13
(2008). Payne calls the Republican violence during the "Red Terror" the "most extensive and
violent persecution of Catholicism in Western History." Id. at 12-13.
72 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 83, 241.
n ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 20; Bernard Adams, Story of the Civil War, IRISH TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3692611.
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tion at the outset of the coup. 7 4 Franco's "Army of Africa" consisted mostly of
Moroccan soldiers supported by the Spanish Foreign Legion, also non-
Spaniards." Objective historians have recorded the pattern of war crimes by
these troops, including mass rape and murder. Republican forces did nothing
comparable.7 6 Executions by the Nationalists during the war ran into the hun-
dreds of thousands. Torture and organized brutality were common policies.
After the Civil War, Spain again closed itself off to Europe. The Falan-
gist economic philosophy of autarky contributed to this.78 The closure also re-
flected the country's utter devastation and national exhaustion after three years
of mass violence. World War II began as Spain's internal war ended. 79 Although
Franco undoubtedly sympathized with the Axis powers that had just assisted his
seizure of government, no Spanish resources remained to contribute to the Axis
war effort, and exposing Spanish territory to further attack was unthinkable in
decimated 1939 Spain.8o The British, of course, controlled Gibraltar, and their
navy dominated the seas by which the Iberian peninsula is surrounded with the
exception of the land border with Britain's major ally France. Franco had plenty
to keep himself busy, what with a broken nation and defeated enemies to hunt
down, persecute, exile, imprison, and eliminate.
As the war turned against the Axis, neutrality was the only prudent
course for Franco. Nevertheless, by war's end, the victorious Allies still regard-
ed his regime as, at best, a passive fascist ally of Nazi Germany. In many west-
ern quarters, leaders and observers called for regime change before Spain could
be readmitted to the community of civilized nations.81 The United Nations ini-
74 See id at 21.
7 See Adams, supra note 73.
76 BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 70 (claiming that Nationalist violence was organized, whereas
Republican violence was mostly sporadic and reactionary).
77 Id. at 74 (recounting that Nationalist killings in their controlled territories may have exceed-
ed 100,000 and may be closer to 200,000).
78 While Franco juggled various bases of support throughout his forty-year reign, four or five
sources dominated during the Civil War and the immediate aftermath: Falangist, Monarchist,
Carlist/traditionalist, the military, and conservative Catholic. Among them, Falangist political
"philosophy" was probably dominant in government policy-making.
79 The Spanish Civil War is often described as a trial run for Hitler's aggressions in World
War II.
so Some scholars claim that Franco's pique at Hitler for not assigning Spain the spoils of
French North Africa explains Spain's neutrality. See, e.g., Giles Tremlett, General Franco Gave
List of Spanish Jews to Nazis, GUARDIAN, June 20, 2010, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 0/jun/20/franco-gave-list-spanish-jews-nazis.
8 Poland referred the question of Franco's regime to the UN Security Council in 1946 as
presenting a security risk. UNITED NATIONS, The Spanish Question, in REPERTOIRE OF THE
PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, CHAPTER VIII: MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
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tially excluded Spain from membership.8 2 Only with the advent of the Cold War
in the late 1940s and early 1950s did Western governments choose to overlook
Franco's fascist roots and see him as one more piece in their big game against
the Soviets. Internally, Franco began to turn away from a decade of severe
repression, autarky, and triumphalism. All serious opposition was dead, exiled,
or imprisoned. Stressing national unity and peace (on his terms) was more pru-
dent than stressing the struggle against liberalism and modernity-both because
it was more conducive to national reconstruction and because it was more palat-
able to the western victors in World War II, whom he sought to cultivate as pa-
trons internationally. It would be unwise to play the role of Last Fascist Stand-
ing. While not wanting to become part of democratic Europe, he nonetheless did
want to share some of the fruits starting to fall to it as members of the Atlantic
alliance against the Soviets.8 4
IV. SELECTIVE AMNESIA AND PROTO-TRANSITION
The post-Franco Spanish elite-right, left, and center-tacitly conclud-
ed a "Pact of Forgetting" (Pacto del Olvido) after Franco's death in 1975.85
They signed no formal document by that name, but their actions evidenced its
existence. 86 One of the Cortes's 87 first post-Franco acts was to pass an Amnesty
Law, and for over thirty years after Spain's democratic transition, discussion of
Franco's regime remained absent from public and political life.8 Leaders from
AND SECURITY 306, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter%208/46-
51_08-7-The%20Spanish%20question.pdf.
82 During its first session, the newly constituted United Nations adopted a resolution urging its
members to act toward Spain in accordance with Spain's close relationship with the defeated Axis
powers. G.A. Res. 39(I), U.N. GAOR, Ist Sess., at 63-64 (Dec. 12, 1946), available at
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/032/90/fMG/NR003290.pdf.OpenElement. This consti-
tuted the basis for an embargo that lasted until 1953.
83 "By the late 1950s the world's geopolitical map had changed dramatically and the Franco
regime, however repugnant to the West, had emerged as a useful ally in its fight against the spread
of communism in Europe and elsewhere." ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 27.
84 Franco's 1945 Decree of Pardon for "rebels" against the state exemplified the regime's
strange ideological dance after WWII, seeking to please the democratic West without becoming
democratic. The Decree slandering the defenders of the legitimate Republic as "rebels against the
state" would have done Soviet propagandists proud. See 1945 Charter of Rights, (B.O.E. 1985,
199) (Spain), available at http://boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1945/199/A00358-00360.pdf
85 ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 2; PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 102-106 (discussing the
prevalence of political dinners in the absence of political discussion in open society); AGUILAR,
supra note 2, at xix-xx (discussing a tacit amnesiac pact among Spanish society).
86 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at xx.
87 "The first Cones would show itself totally subservient to the government in every way."
STANLEY G. PAYNE, THE FRANco REGIME: 1936-1975 323-24 (University Press 1987).
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across the political spectrum feared that publicly airing the merits and demerits
of the Civil War and Franco's rule would renew old animosity and make peace-
ful transition difficult.89 Some observers refer to this broad understanding also
as the "Pact of Silence" (Pacto del Silencio).90 This latter label might reflect a
mere use of synonyms or it might reflect a nuanced critical stance in those ob-
servers who hear in this silence unjustly repressed memory of Francoist crimes.
While elites forged the Pact of Forgetting following Franco's death in
1975, the transition to democracy actually began before Franco's 1975 death-
how far before is a matter for debate. 9' Some trace it to the 1973 assassination
of Admiral Carrero Blanco-Franco's apparent choice to take the reins of gov-
ernment92 and maintain the Caudillo's brand of authoritarian rule.9 3 However,
the seeds of transition were planted much earlier, particularly in the use of re-
pressed memory to promote social peace, if not true reconciliation.
A. Expedience Sows the Seeds of the Pact of Silence
Commentators (particularly on the political left) often have described
the forty years of rule under Franco as "fascist." This description oversimplifies
both history and his regime.94
The fascist label probably does apply aptly to the first decade or so after
the Civil War. It was the Fascist and Nazi governments of Italy and Germany
that tipped the military balance to the Nationalists in the Civil War, and the
United Nations General Assembly declared Franco's regime to be "fascist" in
December 1946.95 Had Hitler won the war, Franco surely would have formally
joined the Axis by its conclusion. 9 6
Falangist doctrine dominated the Nationalist coalition in the Civil War
and the Franco regime in its first dozen years. 97 The Falange Party provided the
8 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at xx.
90 ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 2.
91 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 3.
92 See PAYNE, supra note 87, at 537-42 (stating Franco's choice of Juan Carlos-note the
slight hesitation on page 537, which is interesting). See also id. (stating that appointment of Car-
rero Blanco marked "the first time in the history of the regime that anyone other than Franco held
the position of prime minister [(i.e., head of state)].").
9 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 78.
94 See PRESTON, supra note 7, at 4.
S G.A. Res. 39(1), supra note 82.
96 See PRESTON, supra note 7, at 68.
97
Although there was no shortage of fascist army officers, many of the most
senior generals, invariably Catholic and often monarchists, adopted a patrician
tone and expressed contempt for Falangists as upstart riff-raff. Moreover, in
contrast to the ideological zealots of the Falanage, the high command was
cautious, after the devastation of the Civil War, about making any commit-
ment to the Axis, despite an admiration for German military prowess.. . . In
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propaganda and spirit for the July 1936 right-wing coup against the democrati-
cally elected Republic. Like other fascist movements, Falangist philosophy was
not detailed or profoundly articulated (no fascist Marx or Engels), but it shared
the core fascist beliefs of nationalism, autarky,98  anti-liberalism, anti-
communism," authoritarian obedience, and triumphal heroism found in Italy,
Germany, Japan, and elsewhere. 00 Primo Rivera the Younger,'0o the "hero"
buried alongside Franco in the gargantuan basilica-cave at the Valley of the
Fallen, founded the Falange and was executed by Republicans1 0 2 after his arrest
and eventual trial for treason early in the Civil War. Had he survived, he well
might have competed with Franco for political leadership of Nationalist Spain
after the Nationalist victory. As a martyr for the cause, he presented Franco with
no such political competition.
Franco chose not to rule as a pure Falangist, however. Even though Fa-
langists represented a dominant group in the Nationalist coalition, Franco's
forces were a coalition. They included Falangists, monarchists, conservative
Catholics, Carlists, most of the military elite, as well as an assortment of other
traditionalist and nationalist supporters.10 3 The Falange was the closest thing to
a fascist party within this Nationalist alliance and certainly ideologically promi-
nent, perhaps dominant, during the Civil War and early years of World War
II.104 In that first decade after his 1936 rebellion, Franco probably shared much
of that ideology, exploited Falange mythology particularly through the "martyr-
the aftermath of the Second World War the political pre-eminence of th Fa-
lange within the dictatorship was diminished by Franco. Anxious to clear him-
self of the stigma of his Axis and fascist connections, he began to look for
senior political servants among the ranks of authoritarian Catholics. . . . Over
the subsequent decades that [Falangist] influence was to decline inexorably,
its fascist rhetoric rendered anachronistic by social and economic changes that
were impelling Spain towards ultimate integration in a democratic Europe.
Id. at 5.
98 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 11.
9 The Falange Espanola founded in 1933 by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera did have a strong
socialist wing that excoriated selfish capitalists. These "old shirts" hoped for social reform after a
Nationalist victory, but those elements were lost in the larger Francoist Falange Espanola Tradi-
cionalista that the Caudillo proclaimed in 1936, amalgamating monarchists, Carlists, Catholic
conservatives, and the original Falange with himself at the head. BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 180,
261.
' Franco's Falange differed from the Nazi brand of fascism by the degree to which the former
placed religion-conservative Spanish Catholicism-at the center of its belief system. (Although
there were some anti-clerical Falangists prior to Franco's purging all dissent.)
1o' Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of Miguel, the Spanish dictator (1923-30) prior to the
Second Republic.
102 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 83; PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 15; BEEVOR, supra note 22, at
180.
103 PRESTON, supra note 7, at 4. See also GUNTHER ET AL., supra note 22, at 66-67.
10 See PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 15 (explaining that the Falange was dominant in Spanish
politics, but was never a true political party).
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dom" of Primo Rivera, and drew on the party's considerable sway on the politi-
cal right (which by 1939 was the only side that mattered). However, in creating
his regime, Franco chose to eliminate all political parties, declaring instead a
national "Movement" to which all Spaniards should be loyal. The Falange never
did become the official fascist party of the Francoist state. Instead, Franco's
national "Movement" absorbed it.05
The fascists lost World War II, and the Cold War between the West and
the Soviets commenced almost immediately. Franco perceived the need to por-
tray his regime as a conservatNe Catholic,10 6 but non-fascist, bulwark against
Soviet expansion. 107 At first the West did not buy this pose-memories of the
wartime devastation and atrocities perpetrated by the Generalissimo's Axis pa-
trons were too fresh. The Allies placed Spain under economic boycott and
barred its admission to the United Nations. Economic repercussions from the
boycott were further aggravated by Falange-inspired autarky, and by 1946 Spain
was unable to feed its people. 08 Only last-minute credits and food shipments
from Argentina courtesy of fellow charismatic autocrat Juan Peron warded off
starvation. Spain remained an international pariah through the 1940s.
Eventually, however, the Cold War did provide the opportunity for
Franco to gain some acceptance in the West.109 By early 1953, the United States
at the height of its anti-communist fever was willing to accept the former friend
of Hitler and Mussolini as its ally against the Soviet Union. 0 The United States
granted Franco political legitimacy and trade relations in exchange for military
bases on the strategically important Iberian Peninsula."' Western European
governments initially balked at dealing with Franco, but they soon acqui-
esced.112 Within a few years, the United Nations admitted Spain to member-
ship. 113
The first stages of Spanish amnesia at the national level helped facilitate
such diplomatic rehabilitation on the global level. Had state propaganda in
Spain continued its self-legitimization in the rhetoric of a Crusade against so-
cialism and liberal democracy, western leaders would have found it awkward to
do business. It was easy to recall that Hitler and Mussolini had been Franco's
105 See GUNTHER ET AL., supra note 22, at 66 (explaining that the Falange was absorbed into the
Movimiento Nacional in 1958).
106 Id. (explaining that Spain under Franco was an "extremely confessional" state.).
107 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 53; PRESTON, supra note 7, at 5.
108 MICHAEL RICHARDS, A TIME OF SILENCE: CIVIL WAR AND THE CULTURE OF REPRESSION IN
FRANCO'S SPAIN, 1936-1945, at 133-34 (1998).
109 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 12.
110 Id.
III Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain, Ch. 15, THE LIBRARY OF IBERIAN
RESOURCES ONLINE, available at http://libro.uca.edu/herr/ms15.htm.
112 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 11-12.
113 Id. at 12.
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material and military supporters in that "crusade." Instead of constantly remem-
bering the Civil War, as Falangists were wont to do, by the 1950s it had become
prudent to forget it.11 4 (Although as the continued planning construction of the
Valley of the Fallen would demonstrate, prudence had its limits for the Caudil-
lo.).
Domestic considerations began to militate against memory as well.
With Falange-promoted fascist-style autarky an economic disaster for the coun-
try, a new generation of technocrats with little fervor for fascist ideology rose to
prominence in the 1950s."s They espoused trade with the West, as well as gov-
ernment-directed industrial modernization and expansion. They supported tour-
ism as a source of foreign exchange. The economic technocrats allied with aper-
turistas who believed in gradual political opening.116 Other technocrats were
followers of Opus Dei, a newly energetic Catholic lay organization that promot-
ed modern technical excellence in the service of conservative Church values.,17
Each for their own reasons, these mild "reformers" found hard-line Falange
policies inadequate for Spain's economic and political needs.
Perhaps Franco's heart always remained with the Falangists (as symbol-
ized by the Valley of the Fallen), but his head nodded to the technocrats who
promised to pull his nation out of poverty. The development programs of the
late 1950s and the 1960s were quite successful. In a couple decades, Franco's
Spain ironically presaged the efforts of Communist China to achieve economic
liberalization while maintaining authoritarian political rule.
By the mid-1950s, the Franco regime was experiencing a serious inter-
nal psycho-political tension." 8 The Francoist elite was torn between continuing
to promote the glory of military triumph or seeking legitimacy by emphasizing
domestic peace. The Victory Arch in Madrid exemplifies this tension. Con-
ceived in the 1940s, construction began in 1950 with completion five years lat-
er.11 9 The regime scheduled inauguration for July 18, 1956. It was postponed.120
The monument celebrates the eventual victory of the Nationalists over the Re-
publicans at the very site-Madrid's main university-where the latter, with
much bloodshed, repelled the former's initial attempt to conquer the city in
1936.121 To add insult to injury, a great equestrian statue of the Caudillo would
stand under the arch.12 2 No inauguration ever occurred, and the Franco statue
114 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 53, 313, Fig. 2.1.
1" Id. at 101 (explaining that Technocrats were well-known for ideological neutrality.).
116 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 1-10 (contrasting aperturistas with inmovalistas, or intransi-
gent conservatives).
1" AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 101-02.
" See id. Aguilar describes this well, particularly in Chapter 2, "From the Justification of War
to the Exaltation of Peace." Id. at 29-148.
"l9 Id. at 86.
120 Id. at 86-87.
121 Id. at 85, 87.
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was placed instead at the Ministry of Public Works.12 3 Stalemate, compromise,
or anti-climax, the Victory Arch evidences the growing official ambivalence
toward historical memory. 12 4
Through the 1950s and 1960s, Spain continued to move gradually from
hard-line fascism toward a more pragmatic form of authoritarianism-one that
encouraged economic growth and just enough contact with Atlantic democracies
to foster that growth without also encouraging democratic demands at home.
The government thus jettisoned Falangist autarky. 12 5 Franco's government em-
barked on a policy of domestic amnesia. The Civil War was to be forgotten, or
at least recalled in only a very limited way. Propaganda would no longer con-
centrate on the heroic military victory over godless socialists, but rather on the
national peace and unity that Franco had brought to his people. 126 Conflict
would be forgotten and harmony (according to Franco's tune, of course) exalted.
The hard-line Falangists did not always support these changes, so such evolu-
tion was halting. But policy did evolve. The shift begun in the early 1950s
marked the birth of what was to mature into El Pacto del Olvido. 127
B. Preparing to Cross the Pyrenees
In the early 1960s, Spain sought entry into the European Economic
Community ("EEC"), the precursor to the present European Union ("EU"). Al-
though governments of some EEC states, notably France, favored Spain's ad-
mission, memories of fascism were strong among western Europeans. Moder-
ates and leftists had no trouble mobilizing public opinion against an invitation to
Franco. Nothing in the Treaty of Rome explicitly limited EEC membership to
democracies, but human rights advocates used the occasion of the Spanish entry
effort as a line-drawing event: no country would be admitted to membership in
the Common Market unless it practiced democracy and respected human rights.
Franco was out.
Spaniards, given a taste of the better life by Franco's successful eco-
nomic development programs through most of the 1960s, began to yearn for the
even greater prosperity of democratic Europe. 12 8 Their pride began to demand a
122 Id at 87.
123 Id.
124 See id
125 Id. at 37.
126 See id. at 33-49 (noting the transition from origin-based to performance-based legitimacy in
Francoist propaganda).
127 Encarnacion places the origins of the Pacto del Olvido much later. He argues that Suarez's
1976 suggestion of a royal pardon for all political prisoners formed the basis for a pact of forget-
ting that would be institutionalized with the 1977 Amnesty Law. ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at
36.
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readmission to the family of European states. A tension arose. Pride and pros-
perity would not be forthcoming without human rights. This was the price of
admission to the new Europe. Furthermore, the same middle-class instincts that
sought greater material betterment in the wake of slight material betterment also
sought those bourgeois liberties enjoyed by the French, Italians, and other pros-
perous Europeans. For many Spaniards, human rights were not a price to be paid
for European economic relations, but a further benefit to be enjoyed.
In June 1962, mostly moderate Spanish opposition forces-both from
within and outside Spain-met in Munich and formed the Movimiento Europeo.
This modest attempt at opposition to a totalitarian regime presaged a tactic of
"indirection" that emerged a generation later as reformists throughout Eastern
Europe began to challenge their Communist regimes. Instead of saying that the
regime is bad (a dangerous assertion within a dictatorship), indirect opposition
is marshaled by supporting a blander, less-threatening cause-Europeanism for
the 1962 Munich attendees, and ecology for the opponents of communist re-
gimes in the 1980s in places like Bulgaria.129
Manuel Fraga assumed the post of Minister of Information and Tourism
in 1962.130 This move appeared to enhance the regime's face-lift, making Spain
more attractive to the democratic West.' ' Fraga brought a reputation for bril-
liance, as well as reformist thinking, to the government.132 His early career as a
law professor and public administrator gave confidence to the aperturistas hop-
ing for political reform.13 3 His new ministry's very title, Information and Tour-
ism, offered an odd conjunction of phrase that revealed the new Francoist policy
confluence of public relations and economic development.13 4 Show the world a
kinder, gentler face and have them visit leaving behind pounds, francs,
deutschmarks, and dollars.
Fraga represented the new school of pragmatists. They would justify the
regime's existence by what it would continue to do for Spain (i.e., provide do-
mestic peace and prosperity), not by what it had done per the old Francoist line
(i.e., save Catholic Spain from foreign godlessness through a victorious and
glorious crusade).135 Like his fellow reformists, therefore Fraga would be an
agent of forgetting. Such amnesia would presumably promote both national
harmony and international acceptance.
As a result of the pragmatists' policies of opening up to the West and
planned development, the economy did grow in the 1960s and 1970s up to
129 James Friedberg & Branimir Zaimov, Politics, Environment, and the Rule ofLaw in Bulgar-
ia, 4 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 225, 254 (1994).
130 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 88.
131 Id. at 18, 85-86.
132 Id. at 74.
133 Id at 86.
134 Id at 88-89.
13s See discussion of origin-based versus performance-based legitimacy supra Part IV.A.
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Franco's death, giving aperturistas a strong hand. However, the hard right and
the military wanted to retain power and limit liberties. Franco found himself in
the middle or perhaps placed himself there to maximize his leverage and con-
trol.
Franco's enchantment with power conflicted with his traditionalist vi-
sion for Spain, at least at one key point. He believed in monarchy and eventually
declared Spain to be one in a "fundamental law" that served as a component of
the Francoist constitution under his rule.136 But it was a monarchy without a
monarch. During his almost forty years in power, he never restored a king to the
throne, which would have meant relinquishing his role as head of state (and
commander in chief). He presumably would have continued as head of govern-
ment under a figurehead royal, but that was not sufficient for the Caudillo, lead-
er of the Movement. Perhaps in his private thoughts he toyed with the idea of a
Francoist dynasty, but biology and twentieth-century politics made that implau-
sible. 13 7 By the last years of his regime, Franco had settled on Juan Carlos of the
house of Borb6n as the future king who would succeed him as head of state,
thereby restoring the monarchy.3 8
Franco's handpicked successor as head of state, King Juan Carlos,
turned out to be a closet democrat139 and, after Franco's death, enthusiastically
accepted that Spain's restored monarchy would be a constitutional one. Juan
Carlos understood better than did the diminishing ranks of diehard Francoists
that most Spaniards simply craved to be like other Western Europeans, prosper-
ous and free.
Franco's designation of Juan Carlos as his successor in 1969 sits as a
milestone in Spain's political development. Franco, by naming a successor, im-
plicitly acknowledged the diminishment of his charismatic domination-the
sunset on his reign by personal power and by personality power, dictated by the
distance in time of the Civil War and the aging of its "hero." 4 0
Upon Franco's death in November 1975, the Francoist Cortes duly de-
clared Juan Carlos king.141 Many liberals and leftists doubted the new mon-
136 Ley Organica del Estado [Organic Law of the State] (B.O.E. 1967, 97) (Spain).
137 Juan Carlos's cousin and committed Francoist, Alfonso Duke of Anjou and Cadiz, married
the dictator's granddaughter in 1972. Maybe Franco hoped such a union might form the basis of a
new dynasty, but he must have accurately calculated that both the Spanish people and the interna-
tional community would be more likely to accept Juan Carlos as king.
138 Interestingly, the Law of Succession required Franco's successor to "swear loyalty to the
spirit of 18 July, that is to say, to the origin-based legitimacy of the r6gime." AGUILAR, supra note
2, at 40.
13 Some would say convenient democrat, arguing the new king realized that monarchy could
not survive in Spain without democracy.
140 Ley por la que se provee la concerniente a la sucesi6n en la Jefatura del Estado [Law of
Succession of the Head of State] (B.O.E. 1969, 175) (Spain); AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 40.
141 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 1434. Since the positions of Head of State and Head of Gov-
ernment had been separated in 1973, King Juan Carlos assumed only the position of Head of
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arch's inclination or ability to institute significant democratic reform.142 They
doubted his inclination since the new king had appeared as Franco's dutiful
standard-bearer and privileged representative of traditionalist Spain, particularly
since his 1969 designation and pledge of loyalty to Franco and the principals of
the dictator's regime. They doubted his ability because he had shown no evi-
dence of the strength of character and political gravitas necessary to challenge
the entrenched archconservative Francoist power structure, both civilian and
military.
Juan Carlos would happily surprise many over the transitional decade
following Franco's death. To the extent that Juan Carlos appeared to be Fran-
co's toady in the final years of the latter's rule, one may assume that such ap-
pearances reflected tactical patience.
V. KING, COMPROMISE, CONSTITUTION, AND COUP
The Francoist Cortes swore in Juan Carlos as King immediately after
the Caudillo's death. 143 The new king, now head of state, requested the old re-
gime's prime minister, Carlos Arias Navarro,'" to remain as head of govern-
ment. So far, the established order seemed secure.
However, the new king's hitherto unexpressed desire for meaningful
political reform would conflict.with Arias Navarro's preference for stasis. The
dominant mood in the country likely influenced that of the king.145 Juan Carlos
moved swiftly in exercising his powers in a program to divest those very pow-
ers. He called for the Council of the Realm (an institution intended to help the
king adhere to Francoist principles) to select three candidates from whom he
would choose a new Prime Minister.14 6 The king apparently made clear to the
Council that he wanted Adolfo Suarez's name on the list.14 7 When it accordingly
appeared, Suarez was chosen.14 8
State. Id. at 144. Also interesting for purposes of the democratic transition, Juan Carlos did not
become Head of the Movement, a position now incorporated into the Presidency. Id.
142 Prior to overseeing Spain's successful democratic transition, King Juan Carlos was nick-
named "Juan Carlos the Brief' by many Spaniards, who assumed that his reign would be short and
insignificant. ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 34.
143 See supra Part IV.
'4 Arias had a nasty Civil War record, having been the Nationalist prosecutor in Malaga where
"horrific" revenge against Republicans included a reported 20,000 executions between 1937 and
1944. BEEVOR, supra note 22, at 74. He was not a great candidate to lead a conciliatory transition.
145 "[T]he Spanish people expected the King to form a new executive capable of transforming
Spain into a modem and progressive country." PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 144.
146 In the Spanish system in effect then and now, the "President" of Parliament is the "Prime
Minister." Unlike in many other democracies, therefore, the terms are interchangeable and both
will be used in this Article.
147 Symposium, Peaceful Transitions to Democracy: Peaceful Transitions to Constitutional
Democracy, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 1953, 1957 (1998).
148 Id.; PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 161.
8552012]
31
Friedberg: The Wane in Spain (of Universal Jurisdiction): Spain's Forgetful
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Manuel Fraga, the most prominent reformist in the latter half of Fran-
co's long rule, was passed over. Suarez was the younger and lesser known of the
two, and perhaps generational change was a factor in Juan Carlos's calculus. 149
Perhaps Fraga's strong-willed brilliance made him the less attractive partner to
the King. Or his occasional resort to repressive actions when he had occupied
positions of power.'50 Or perhaps the King and his advisors sensed the rela-
tive1 5' rightward movement in Fraga's beliefs that would characterize his later
years, 152 notwithstanding Fraga's reformist credentials. The King presumably
wanted a democrat who could sit comfortably in the middle of the political spec-
trum. And Fraga, while being a man of the reformist center, did not always stay
there.
Initially, Juan Carlos's selection of Adolfo Suarez as his own choice for
prime minister153 in mid-1976 would not encourage progressives' hopes-
leftists and many democrats distrusted Suarez for his solid Francoist resum. 1 54
At the time of his appointment, most of the Spanish public regarded him as "a
mere Francoist," and many doubted his experience and gravitas to challenge the
Francoist bunker.155 His somewhat thin record seemed to place him to the right
of Fraga and Foreign Minister Jose Maria de Areilza, the two other presumed
contenders. 56 But Suarez quickly demonstrated that he and the King would
move toward constitutional monarchy. As new.prime minister, he proposed a
one-year timetable for legislating a political reform law, submitting it to national
referendum and holding open national elections for the first time in more than
four decades.
Suarez and Juan Carlos walked an uncertain middle ground between a
distrustful political left, which included outlawed communists and their support-
ing labor unions, as well as socialists and liberals, and an ultra-conservative
right, including much of the military elite and Francoist government hard-
149 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 162.
150 Id. at 163. See also JOHN F. COVERDALE, THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF SPAIN AFTER
FRANcO 44 (1979).
'' Some, perhaps Fraga himself, would argue that his beliefs did not substantially change-
rather the political spectrum shifted leftward.
152 Some would argue that Fraga's rightward political shift came only after Suarez assumed the
Presidency, which event left Fraga no ground to dominate the political center as he had previous-
ly. PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 84.
1s3 In Spain the prime minister is called the "President." However, since he is only head of
government, not head of state, the position is effectively that of a parliamentary prime minister,
not that of an American-style president.
154 In contrast to Fraga, who was also a Francoist insider, Suarez was relatively unknown to the
Spanish general public. PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 162.
5 Id. at 164.
156 Id. at 163-64. Areilza appeared at the time even more reformist than Fraga, having toured
the globe promoting the idea of Spanish democratization, including showing some openness to
allowing the Communists to participate in a transitioned political system.
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liners.157 However, the King and prime minister calculated that the bulk of
Spaniards wanted both democracy and peace-and would support their one-year
plan for birthing a pluralist constitutional monarchy.
National amnesia was a key element in their plan. Spain was not partic-
ularly amnesiac at Franco's death. Although his government in its later years
had indeed emphasized its present accomplishments rather than its past military
conquest of the red threat, thus softening the earlier triumphalism of the re-
gime, 158 the country still well remembered the Civil War. "[W]hatever one's
position, whatever one's family circumstances with regard to the war, it was
very vivid in society's historical memory."159 Most Spaniards feared a repetition
of the vividly recalled horror. "That such a thing should be avoided at all costs,
was the message coming from society and delivered very clearly to its leaders. .
There was, therefore, a positive consensus on moderation, prudence and
peaceful change ... ,, 6 o Juan Carlos and Suarez thus would follow the people
as well as lead them: forget and go forward.
As suggested above, to some degree this would continue the Proto-
transition of the government moderates in the last decades of Franco's rule, Fra-
ga most prominent among them. That Proto-transition emphasized domestic
peace and economic development to justify the regime's continued existence
rather than the Falangist emphasis on the crushing of the Republic in the "cru-
sade" of 1936-39. The moderates' approach (only partially followed by Franco
himself) depended in part on forgetting-or at least repressing memory of-the
antagonism of the 1930s, eschewing both triumphalism and blame, and seeking
national quiet with passive acceptance of the regime. Francioist moderates fol-
lowed this line to preserve power. 161 Defeated Republicans inside Spain acqui-
esced in it to preserve their tenuous survival. But for such an approach to con-
tinue after Franco's death, most Spaniards on the hard right and hard left-non-
forgetters-would have to be brought into any expansion of such conciliatory
amnesia. For the right this meant protection of the military, the monarchy, and
the Church. For the left this meant full political participation, including legaliza-
tion of the Communist Partyl 62 (as well as all other parties, none of which was
permitted under Franco).
So Juan Carlos and Suarez promoted a policy agenda in the early post-
Franco years that interwove this constructive amnesia with a legal fabric that
1s7 By this point the Church, interestingly, had become moderately reformist, was no longer
part of the Francoist right-wing, and supported the kind of gradualist reform pushed by the King
and Suarez.
1 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 35-40.
1 Symposium, supra note 147, at 1955. See also Omar G. Encamaci6n, Reconciliation after
Democratization: Coping with the Past in Spain, POL. Sci. Q. 435 (2008).
160 Symposium, supra note 147, at 1955. See also AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 163.
161 See discussion supra Part 4.
162 Perez Llorca comments, "The Communist Party was legalized one morning, while the coun-
try was more or less on holiday." Symposium, supra note 147, at 1959.
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would support communal tolerance, political compromise, and democratization.
This agenda's legislative menu prescribed a framework of political reform law,
legislated labor rights, an amnesty statute, and ultimately a democratic constitu-
tion. Western Europe provided the model.16 3
Psychology, economics, and politics came together at this very special
point in time. The Spanish people after forty years of repression wanted the lib-
erty of European democracies. After forty years of poverty followed by a taste
of prosperity, they wanted the full material prosperity of the European Commu-
nity. The Proto-transition had exposed them to both this liberty and prosperity,
by inbound tourism from democratic lands, by outbound Spanish labor to those
same lands, by economic development and by limited liberalization in Spanish
media.
Popular will would confirm the political reform law and the Constitu-
tion through referendum.16 4 Political finesse would bring most of the military
and the right-wing under the same tent of national consensuss65 as the Com-
munist Party. There would be no trials, no truth commissions, no lustration, no
debates over past wrongs-a Pact of Forgetting entered into implicitly by the
elites, right, left, and center, who moved Spain to democracy in the half-decade
following the death of Francisco Franco. Democracy was materially expedient.
Everyone agreed that picking scabs from the Civil War was not conducive to
assuring peace and material comfort.
Perhaps the boldest legislative step-even bolder than the new demo-
cratic constitution of 1978-was the Suarez government's first major project,
the Law on Political Reform, which would mandate a pluralist, elective democ-
racy. The King and others certainly must have conceived of such a law before
Suarez assumed the office of president'6 6 in July 1976. In fact, it was probably
Arias Navarro's unwillingness or inability to aggressively shepherd such legisla-
tion that led Juan Carlos to replace him with Suarez. Suarez allowed himself and
his government one year to draft the law, pass it through the Cortes and have it
ratified by the Spanish people. Suarez masterfully accomplished these tasks
between mid-1976 and mid-1977 by successfully shepherding the Law of Politi-
163 Id. at 1955.
' Spanish voters overwhelmingly confirmed the new constitution in a referendum on Decem-
ber 15, 1976. See Reftrendum/Diciembre 1976, Infoelectoral.mir.es (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/busquedaAvanzadaAction.html;jsessionid=E8254EE51BD7C
2F6185A48A55613C998.app2.
165 Some claim that Fraga's move rightward and founding of the Accion Popular ("AP") party
provided a democratic outlet for the political right and thus facilitated peaceful transition, while
ultimately and ironically marginalizing himself politically. One suspects that such a sacrifice of
his own interests to the nation's might have been inadvertent.
166 In Spain, the king, of course, is head of state. The head of government is referred to as
"President" or as the "Prime Minister." Although the word "president" is used, the functions and
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cal Reform of 1976.167 Impressively, he persuaded the last Francoist Cortes to
vote itself out of existence by passing the legislation that created participatory
democracy in Spain.16 8
Spanish voters overwhelmingly ratified the Law of Political Reform in a
national referendum on December 15, 1976. Communists and Socialists had
opposed passage, with the latter interestingly appearing more strident than the
former. The leftist elite was apparently out-of-step even with its own constitu-
ency since ninety-four percent of voters approved the reform.' One suspects
that the leftist leaders were more unhappy that a former Francoist Cortes and
centrist government officials had authored the reforms without them than with
the actual content of those reforms. The reforms paved the way for the let's-not-
argue-the-past transition that the King, Suarez, and their broad base of allies
would successfully pursue over the next few years.
A. 1977 Amnesty Law and the 1978 Constitution: Legislating Amnesia (or
Silence)
"[E]lections took place on June 15, 1977, . .. under conditions of una-
bridged freedom, peace and normalcy; and that was a gigantic step."l 7 0 Suarez
continued to head government, now as a democratically elected leader, albeit of
a minority government. His centrist Union of the Democratic Center ("UCD")
held only a plurality in parliament, requiring cooperation with other parties-
sometimes left, sometimes right-to govern.17' This need for cooperation across
the political spectrum no doubt strengthened the Pact of Forgetting in the first
years of transition.
Fraga's conservative Allianza Popular ("AP") finished fourth in the
1977 elections with only eight percent of the vote, less even than the Com-
munists' nine percent.172 The elections thus quashed any hope of continuing a
167 The Law on Political Reform of 1976 is an "organic law." This concept is found more in
civil law systems than in common law jurisdictions. It signifies an important statute that sets broad
rules of structure and substance in a particular area of governance, anticipating subsidiary statutes
to legislate particulars. Historically, the Law on Political Reform occupied a monumental and
somewhat ironic position. Passed by the last Francoist parliament in its final months, it was the
eighth and last of Francoist "fundamental laws"-statutes that together formed the Francoist Con-
stitution. See Symposium, supra note 147, at 1957. It also marked the end of that constitution and
of the old regime and the beginning of the new.
168 See id.
169 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 172. Socialist leader Filipe Gonzales appeared almost silly,
going to the European Parliament to seek its support in opposition to the reforms. The parliament
was not interested in opposing what seemed a sensible step toward democracy merely on the
grounds that it was authored by former non-democrats.
170 Symposium, supra note 147, at 1960.
1' Id. at 1960-61.
172 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 186.
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Francoist government. 17 3 Suarez's center-right UCD and Gonzales' center-left
Socialists garnered a combined sixty-four percent, 174 demonstrating the elec-
torate's desire for moderation and a peaceful transition. 1 These results starkly
contrasted with the polarized elections during the last period of democracy in
the 1930s.
The new democratically-elected parliament passed an Amnesty Law as
one of its first major accomplishments. While the Pact of Forgetting was an
unwritten, implicit political understanding, the Amnesty Law came as close as
any formal act to legislating that informal, amnesiac silence. The amnesty cov-
ered most alleged political crimes committed on either side during the Franco
years.176
Following elections and the passage of the Amnesty Law in 1977, a
Constitutional Committee of the Cortes formed. That committee in turn appoint-
ed a drafting subcommittee of seven deputies known as the Ponencia. After
months of drafting and debate, a modern democratic European constitution
emerged. It included basic civil liberties, some social rights, separation of
church and state (with recognition of historic connection to Catholicism), pri-
macy of international law, a limited politically neutral monarchy, independent
political parties, quasi-federal autonomous regions for the entire state territory,
an independent judiciary, and a bi-cameral legislature-all important elements
in balancing stability with freedom, as most Spaniards seemed to desire. The
Cortes ratified the document on October 31, 1978. The voters did the same by
referendum on December 6, 1978.177
The Amnesty Law of 1977 and the Constitution of 1978, together,
helped cement the Pact of Forgetting. A new order formed itself from the old
with no violent rupture, only with a peaceful metamorphosis. Suarez and his
UCD coalition of moderate conservatives, liberals, and social democrats per-
formed brilliantly in the first phase of the democratic transition, the closing
years of the 1970s, fulfilling the promise of the peaceful transition from dicta-
torship to democracy.'7 8 The Pact of Forgetting, originating under Franco and
sealed with the Amnesty Law of 1977 was necessary to such performance since
the Suarez coalition included both moderate Francoists and moderate opponents
17 Id. at 189.
174 Id. at 186.
17s Id. at 189.
176 Whether an amnesty law could insulate perpetrators against human rights prosecutions was
apparently not debated, an issue that has become of interest during the present attempt to prose-
cute Judge Garzon for violating that amnesty law by starting an inquiry into Franco-era crimes.
The question is all the more interesting in light of Spain's 1978 Constitution, which generally
elevates international law above domestic statutes.
1 ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 39-43. See also Symposium, supra note 147, at 1963-66.
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of Franco. Their unifying goal, successfully pursued, was establishment of a
stable pluralist democracy.
However, after Suarez and his allies had largely achieved that goal, the
UCD coalition began to fall apart and Suarez's political fortunes declined.17 9
Once democracy was achieved, Suarez's coalition revealed its inherent instabil-
ity. UCD elements disagreed over education, divorce, and the role of the
Church, among other domestic issues.180 Additionally, ETA terrorism on behalf
of Basque independence was peaking, with hundreds of resulting deaths in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.' 8 Parts of the military chafed under this social
change and perceived instability, as well as the devolution of central powers to
the regions under the 1978 Constitution. Periodically during the Suarez years,
evidence of coup conspiracies surfaced, but nothing serious occurred.18 2 Only in
early 1981, after Suarez had resigned the presidency and his UCD coalition dis-
solved, did elements of the military act. Conventional wisdom credits King Juan
Carlos with saving democracy.
On February 23, 1981, just short of a month after Suarez's resignation
and at a peak of uncertainty for the new democracy, Colonel Antonio Tejero
Molina led a group of Civil Guards into the Cortes with guns firing. 8 3 They
held the Parliament hostage in an attempt to spark a coup d 'tat. In other loca-
tions, tanks moved into the streets. General Alfonso Armada, reputed to be close
to the King, apparently organized the rebellion and hoped to install himself as
national leader.184 That evening Juan Carlos went on national television in his
Marshall's uniform as Commander-in-Chief.8 8 He ordered all soldiers back to
barracks, condemned the attempted coup, and declared himself for democracy
and the Constitution.' 86
The coup collapsed. The King became a national hero.
Spontaneous demonstrations against the failed coup and in support of
democracy and the King erupted throughout the country in subsequent days.
Fraga joined the demonstrators in the street, firming his credentials as a demo-
crat and supporter of the constitution.'8 7 His star was to rise again a bit with
Suarez off the stage. Moderate conservatives from the dissolving UCD returned
to Fraga and strengthened his heretofore struggling AP.' 88 The biggest political
1' PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 191.
180 Id
"'1 Id. at 189, 191.
182 Id. at 192.
183 Id. See also Bill Cemlyn-Jones, King Orders army to crush coup, GUARIMAN (Feb. 23,
1981), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1981/feb/23/spain.fromthearchive.
184 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 192; Cemlyn-Jones, supra note 183.
185 PALOMARES, supra note 14, at 192.
186 Id.; Cemlyn-Jones, supra note 183.
187 PALOMAREs, supra note 14, at 192.
188 ENCARNACION, supra note 8, at 57.
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winner, though, was Filipe Gonzales, who had emerged as the leader of a large
center-left party, poised to take power in the 1982 elections.' 89
That a monarch should have preserved the democratic transition demon-
strates how Spain's successful move toward democracy this time was so much
more mature and inclusive than the spasmodic Republican effort in the 1930s
that was quashed by civil war and fascist triumph. A consensus had developed
for democracy, prosperity, and Europe. A companion consensus enjoined any
debate about past injustices that might threaten the newfound democratic peace.
The coup attempt likely strengthened the Pact of Forgetting, reminding Span-
iards of the danger of opening old wounds.
The King emerged as the undisputed champion of the new democratic
Spanish state. Critics debate whether it was conviction or wise self-interest that
prompted him to oppose the coup.' 90 For more than a decade, the 1982 failed
coup was the only significant public breach in the Pact of Silence, interestingly
initiated by Francoists, not by Franco's victims. What people do ultimately mat-
ters in history and politics. We may never know Juan Carlos's thoughts, but his
actions stopped the coup before it had a chance to succeed or at least cause ter-
rible strife. The real memory of the Civil War, Spain's public "forgetting" of the
Civil War, and its carnage united the bulk of Spaniards in 1981 and aided the
King in shutting down the marginalized conspirators.
A decade of transition passed between Franco's death and Spain's ad-
mission into the European Community ("EC").191 Moderates came to dominate
the military, as hard-line Francoists retired or were marginalized. Spain joined
the Council of Europe and accepted its human rights treaty and mechanism in
1977, well before its accession to the EC.192 This has become the normal pattern
for newly democratic European states. It is easier to join the Council, since its
requirements (i.e., don't violate human rights) are relatively easy to meet for a
new democracy. In contrast, there are complex economic and legal reforms re-
189 Id. at 58.
190 Ronald Hilton, Spain: King Juan Carlos, WAIS STANFORD (July 19, 2003),
http://wais.stanford.edulSpain/spain-kingjuancarlos7l903.html (suggesting that King Juan Carlos
was cognizant of at least one coup plot).
191 The European Community succeeded its component, the European Economic Community,
and the EC itself became a component of the EU. The terms have technical, legal distinctions not
relevant here, but have been used somewhat interchangeably by the news media. See Background
Note: Spain, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2878.htm (last updated Jan. 5,
2012) (State department listing date of accession as 1986). See also Spain, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/spain/indexen.htm (listing 1986 as date of
EU entry).
192 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Spain, http://www.coe.int/en/web/coe-portal/country/spain (last visited
Mar. 20, 2012). All EU states are members of the Council of Europe, while the converse is not
true, as evidenced by Turkey and Norway.
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quired for a new European Union ("EU") entrant. In practice, therefore, Europe-
an integration exposes populations of emerging democracies to human rights
consciousness early in the process. This is reinforced by the knowledge that the
EU itself makes human rights observance a criterion for accession.
Until the Pinochet case, no further serious challenges to the Pact came
from elites on the right or left. Ironically for most of that period of a dozen-plus
years, Spain was governed by socialists under Filipe Gonzales. He did not want
the first social democratic government in a half century threatened by civil
strife. Also, as a participant in the Pact, he internalized its tactical philosophy.
Finally, in later years of his administration, corruption pervaded the government
and any reform or radicalism posed a threat to Gonzales's hold on power.
VI. BRIEF FANTASY ROUNDTABLE IN THE YEAR 2000193
Frei:194 It is hypocritical of you to prosecute our dictators and
not your own. Franco was as evil as Pinochet and committed his
crimes on your own soil. But you interfere in our affairs and ig-
nore your own. 195
Garzon: If we agree that Pinochet did evil, how can you oppose
our attempts to punish that evil? Not all wrongs can be righted
at once. We must begin somewhere. And I mean no disrespect
to sovereignty over your own soil. In everyday matters, sover-
eignty should prevail. However, genocide, torture, and the like
are crimes of a different sort. They offend all humanity. They
threaten all humanity. And so we call them "crimes against hu-
manity." Universal justice demands that they be prosecuted
wherever justice can be done.
Frei: Don't you admit that it would be less hypocritical if you
prosecuted Franco and his cronies first, before hauling Latin
Americans into Spanish courts? Particularly considering your
colonial history?
Garzon: Our work is neither hypocritical nor blind. Rather, it is
a moral and legal strategy that establishes precedent and opens
doors. Today, Pinochet is a recent evil whose crimes may be
193 See DISCLAIMER, supra note 20. Baltasar Garzon and Manuel Fraga are joined in this
dialogue by Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Chile's president from 1994-2000 (which coincided with
the Pinochet trial), King Juan Carlos of Spain, and Henry Kissinger.
194 President of Chile at the time of Pinochet's arrest in London. See Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Eduardo,
CLUB DE MADRID, http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/miembro/eduardofrei-ruiz tagle (last visited
Mar. 20, 2012).
1 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 37.
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prosecuted. His prosecution is also a metaphor for what the
Spanish have failed to do for three decades since Franco's
death. This allegory will awaken conscience and lead to a reex-
amination of the Franco crimes.19 6
Frei: But Spain's transition to democracy since 1975 has only
been possible because of your nation's Pact of Silence-a col-
lective national agreement to not debate who was right and who
was wrong in your civil war, a debate which surely would have
ensued had Franco's victims sought an accounting immediately
upon his death. The unspoken social consensus in Spain was to
"let sleeping dogs lie" rather than pose a threat to democratic
transition or risk another civil war. Now, only decades later, do
you dare raise such issues, even metaphorically. How do you
presume to deny Chileans and Argentineans that same right to
choose silent peace over dangerous dialogue?
Garzon: I do not deny them that right. Feel free to prosecute or
not prosecute your dictators. I only assert the right of humanity
to enforce universal standards universally. Wherever perpetra-
tors of crimes against humanity can be reached, they should be
held accountable for their heinous misdeeds.
Henry: But who appointed you as God, as humanity's repre-
sentative, as the fiery sword of justice? Don't you see the dan-
ger in your doctrine of universal jurisdiction? Once we can
prosecute anyone anywhere, politics will take over. A zealous
ideologue will find crimes against humanity in the legitimate
policy choices of legitimate governments. One person's aggres-
sion is another's humanitarian intervention.
Garzon: Self-serving' 97 pseudo-moderation! You know very
well, Henry, that judges and state attorneys regularly face the
196 See also Meisler, supra note 6. Our fictional Garzon admits here to a metaphorical link
between Franco and Pinochet that the real Garzon denied at the time of the Pinochet extradition
attempt.
197 Henry Kissinger, former United States. National Security chief and Secretary of State, was
accused of international crimes for his alleged role in supporting Pinochet's illegal coup against
the elected Chilean government of Salvador Allende and for his role in directing the United States
war in Vietnam. Jonathan Franklin & Duncan Campbell, Kissinger May Face Extradition to
Chile, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2002, 23:34 EDT),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jun/12/chile.pinochet. See also Kenneth Maxwell, The
Other 9/11: The United States and Chile, 1973, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 147, 147-151
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challenge of performing their jobs with integrity. If they prose-
cute merely out of ideological fanaticism, vendetta, or any other
unjust cause, it will be evident to their community-local or
global-and their work will be rejected. On the other hand, if
they prosecute the guilty-whether Nazis, Stasi, al-Qaeda, or
aggressors masking as liberals-and if they are willing to pros-
ecute all of these for justice and not for ideology, then the world
will recognize that humanity is served.
Juan Carlos:But what does this mean for Spain? Our Pacto del
Olvido has served us well. We have rejoined Europe. We are
prosperous. We are democratic. We are happy. Why would you
choose to reopen old wounds?
Garzon: While we were healing, recovering from Franco, those
bandages of silence served us well. We could not bear touching
those wounds, and it was good that they remained covered. But
democracy has given us strength-Europe has given us
strength-and it is time to remove those bandages and clean out
the old wounds, which left untreated will fester. Only justice
can cleanse them.
Henry: Self-righteous crap. Only an egoist liberal would pro-
mote himself and his ideology so unabashedly and call it "jus-
tice."
VII. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN SPAIN: ADVENT AND EXPANSION
Furthermore, Spanish courts have jurisdiction over acts commit-
ted abroad by Spaniards and foreigners, if these acts constitute
any of the following offenses under Spanish law: (a) genocide;
(b) terrorism; (c) sea or air piracy; (d) counterfeiting; (e) offens-
es in connection with prostitution and corruption of minors and
incompetents; (f) drug trafficking; (g) any other offense which
Spain is obligated to prosecute under an international treaty or
convention. 198
'9 Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] [Law on the Judiciary] art. 23.4 (B.O.E. 1985,
157) (Spain) (as effective 1985-2009) (translating the Spanish version of Articulo 23.4). The
Courts amended this statute in 2009, limiting its scope as discussed below. Note that while this
statute gave Spanish courts competence over cases based on universal jurisdiction, the Spanish
legislature never granted similar power based on the passive personality principle, in which courts
would assert jurisdiction based on the Spanish nationality of the victim. Some commentators
assert that this jurisdictional gap led to strained logic in some of the Spanish case law growing out
of the Chilean and Argentine cases. See Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL
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Universal jurisdiction permits any state or appropriately empowered in-
ternational tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of certain serious international
crimes (such as piracy, genocide, systemic torture, and slavery) regardless of the
location of the act or the nationality of wrongdoer or victim.199 In doing so, uni-
versal jurisdiction departs from traditional international legal doctrine, which for
centuries adhered to a strict territorial principle. That principle limited a state's
power to enact and enforce 200 criminal law to activities occurring within its bor-
ders.
A few limited exceptions to the traditional territorial principle devel-
oped in recent centuries. "Nationality" jurisdiction allows a state to prosecute its
own citizens for acts outside its borders, and the "protective" principle allows a
state to prosecute a person committing an act outside the state, which act un-
dermines a legitimate fundamental interest of that state (e.g., immigration fraud
at a consulate). 2 01 By the twentieth century, some governments asserted other
disputed bases for jurisdiction, such as "effects" (consequences of action abroad
felt in forum state) 202 and "passive personality" (forum state's national harmed
by acts abroad).203 The latter doctrine has partnered with universal jurisdiction
AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 187-188 (Prof. Ian Bownlie & Prof. Vaughan Lowe eds.,
2003).
199 Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REV. 785,
785 (1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 403-04, 423 (1987) (Section
403 places reasonableness constraints on the exercise of universal jurisdiction.). Some scholars,
jurists, and statespersons have challenged the validity of this doctrine or sought to limit its scope,
as is discussed herein.
200 Legal analysts recognize two broad functional categories of a state's jurisdictional power:
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. As the phrases imply, prescriptive jurisdiction signifies
the authority to make law, as in a parliament passing a statute or a king issuing a decree. Scholars
also refer to this as legislative jurisdiction. Enforcement jurisdiction signifies the authority to put
prescribed laws into effect. Writers sometimes sub-categorize this authority as judicial and execu-
tive jurisdiction, the former being the power of judges to interpret the law and decide cases, the
latter being the power to arrest, incarcerate, fine, implement legal mandates, conduct administra-
tion, etc. It is mostly under the function of prescriptive jurisdiction that extraterritoriality has
expanded in recent decades. So, for example, while many states now might generally accept the
power of another state to proscribe some action of that state's national if performed in the host
state, no such host state would accept any asserted authority by the national's state to arrest her in
the host state's territory.
Universal jurisdiction tests traditional limits by allowing trials (judicial jurisdiction) by states that
are not the locus of the wrongful act. Even advocates of universal jurisdiction generally would
draw a line between the power to adjudicate certain international crimes extra-territorially (e.g.,
the legitimate Eichmann trial in Israel) and the exercise of executive jurisdiction on foreign soil
(e.g., the illegitimate "arrest" of Eichmann in Argentina by Israeli agents).
201 Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 440 (Supp.
1935).
202 Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735, 739 (2004).
203 REYDAMS, supra note 198, at 21.
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in some of the cases central to this Article. 204 However, prior to World War II,
despite some supportive academic commentary,20 5 international law did not
recognize universal jurisdiction 2 06 except in regard to piracy and perhaps slave
trade, which by their nature generally occur largely outside the territorial juris-
diction of any state.207
International law's general restriction against the extraterritorial asser-
tion of jurisdiction comported with the dominant "positivist"208 posture during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-that it was a body of law only
concerned with behavior between states and therefore not concerned with crimi-
nal behavior of individuals, except piracy. Furthermore, the twin positivist con-
cepts of exclusive territorial power and absolute state sovereignty made illegiti-
mate any prosecution for wrongs committed outside a state's boundaries. A cor-
ollary to these positivist postulates precluded any state or international body
from prosecuting human rights abusers for violations within another state.
All this changed with Hitler and Nuremberg.
If traditional international law were to lack a mechanism for prosecuting
individuals for massive trans-border heinous behavior due to limitations im-
posed by doctrines of sovereignty and territoriality, Nazi criminals would escape
legal punishment, or at best be subject to haphazard, inconsistent, and incom-
plete justice within devastated and dysfunctional postwar judicial systems in
individual European states. The victorious major Allies-the United States, the
Soviet Union, Britain, and France-chose to prosecute the Nazi leaders under
international law and thereby changed that law forever. By international agree-
ment, the Allies created a tribunal of distinguished jurists and defined the inter-
national crimes for which the defendants would be tried-Crimes Against
Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity.209 The Allies cannot be said
to have invented universal jurisdiction-the pieces were already in place-but
they certainly gave it expression.
204 For instance, prosecutors in Spain and Germany highlighted the status of Spanish and Ger-
man nationals, respectively, as victims of Pinochet's regime in Argentina. See generally id at 187.
205 See generally Dickinson, supra note 201 (discussing the status of jurisdiction in internation-
al law in conjunction with a 1935 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime).
206 Scholars had occasionally used the word "universal" to describe representative jurisdiction
whereby one state prosecutes an alleged serious felon found in its territory for a crime committed
in a sister state because of obstacles to obtaining a trial in the state of occurrence (e.g., extradition
difficulties). This was not true universal jurisdiction as we discuss it now. REYDAMS, supra note
198, at 31-35. The frequency with which representative jurisdiction was actually exercised is
unclear, but one suspects it was a rare practice since little is reported in the literature of its prac-
tice.
207 See Dickinson, supra note 201, at 440 (discussing that the draft convention specifically
provided for universal jurisdiction with respect to piracy).
208 REYDAMS, supra note 198, at 35. According to positivist theory, "universal jurisdiction" is
justified by reference to "a state's internal sovereignty." Id.
209 ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1986); see generally ROBERT E. CONOT,
JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. ed. 1983).
8672012]
43
Friedberg: The Wane in Spain (of Universal Jurisdiction): Spain's Forgetful
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Universal jurisdiction doctrine lay dormant for the half-century of Cold
War that immediately followed the Nuremberg trials. The world community
could no longer create tribunals as it had at Nuremberg to try international
crimes because the two great Cold War power blocks, Soviet and Western,
would invariably disagree about the criminality of behavior within major inter-
national crises, precluding the authorization of judicial action by broadly ac-
cepted treaty or by the United Nations Security Council.
By the early 1990s Spain had entered the EC, a democratically elected
Socialist government had ruled the nation for most of the decade, the Berlin
Wall had fallen, the Soviet empire had dissolved, and democratic governments
had replaced dictatorships in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Afri-
ca. Some segments of newly liberated populations called for accountings of the
wrongs done by the recently ended dictatorships. Other segments were content
to let the past be forgotten or were compelled to silence by menacing militaries
that demanded amnesties as the price for democratic transition (as in Chile and
Argentina).2 10
Before Spanish attorneys attempted prosecutions of Latin American dic-
tators based on universal jurisdiction, Italian and French lawyers had taken the
more narrow approach of bringing cases in their home courts based on "passive
personality" (i.e., wrongs suffered by citizens of their countries at the hands of
those dictators).21 1 Passive personality jurisdiction purports to allow a state to
prosecute defendants who commit wrongs against that state's nationals outside
the territory of the state.2 12 Some states and legal experts find this to be an over-
reaching and illegitimate assertion of extraterritorial executive and judicial pow-
er. 213 In any event, the Italian and French cases had broken ground for the juris-
dictionally more far-reaching Spanish prosecutions.2 14
Numerous Argentine and Chilean nationals moved to Spain during the
decades of dictatorship in their own countries, chiefly the 1970s and 1980s.
Some were Spanish citizens. A libertarian human rights consciousness pervaded
the post-Franco Spain. Like Spain, Chile and Argentina, along with most other
Latin countries, had rid themselves of their dictators by the 1990s. The fall of
210 REYDAMS, supra note 198, at 184-85.
211 Id. at 140 (discussing France's assertions of passive personality jurisdiction); RoHT-
ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 13.
212 REYDAMS, supra note 198, at 21. See also O'Keefe, supra note 202, at 739.
213 See Dickinson, supra note 201, at 440.
214 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 130-32; see generally REYDAMS, supra note 198..
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the Berlin Wall and the end of apartheid in South Africa added to the global
political zeitgeist. In this heady political atmosphere, some of these Argentine
and Chilean exiles chose to challenge the legal impunity still enjoyed by their
former oppressors.
Procedural mechanisms somewhat unique to the Spanish judicial system
would support their efforts. An investigating magistrate in the Spanish judicial
system 215 (and many other civil law systems) wields a collection of powers not
found in a single individual under United States law. While fully a judge, he
exercises significant prosecutorial functions usually associated with the execu-
tive branch. He may initiate investigations or pursue them at the request of
complainants, and he takes an active role in fact-gathering. The Spanish Consti-
tution of 1978 seems to encourage his initiative where it exhorts "judges to do
justice for Spanish citizens." 2 16 As demonstrated by Garzon and his colleagues,
the Spanish investigating judge may seek international judicial and executive
cooperation on his own initiative, without approval of his government or superi-
or tribunals. 217
Furthermore, Spanish law provides for an acci6n popular.2 18 This action
bears some resemblance to "private attorney general" suits in the United States.
Like private attorney general suits, the acci6n popular enables private citizens
to bring complaints against societal wrongs so as to vindicate the public's inter-
est.219 However, the Spanish acci6n popular empowers the potential plaintiff in
ways its American counterpart does not. First, it initiates a criminal proce-
dure, 22 0 not merely a civil case. Also, standing rules are more permissive than in
other legal systems, allowing public-interest groups not claiming personalized
injury to sue. Finally, particular United States statutes only authorize private
attorney general suits in limited subject areas. The Spanish acci6n popular is
broadly available.
215 REYDAMS, supra note 198, at 185; The Relation Between the Public Prosecutor and the
Police, EURO JUST., http://www.euro-justice.com/member states/spain/country report/630/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012). See also Beatrix Elsner et al., The Examining Magistrate's Function and
Involvement in Investigative Matters, 14 EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 225, 227, 235 (2008).
216 CONsTITuci6N ESPA&OLA [C.E.] art. 124(1) (B.O.E. 1978, n. 311) (Spain); ROHT-ARRIAZA,
supra note 5, at 11-12.
217 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 4-5.
218 Richard J. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, AM. U. WASHINGTON C. L.,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v6i3/pinochet.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (discussing
that "accidn popular" means a "popular action" and is akin to a private attorney general, except it
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A. Stalking the Condor: Pinochet and the Argentines
Carlos Castresana started the ball rolling. He brought the first Spanish
suit based on universal jurisdiction against Latin American human rights abus-
ers in March 1996.221 Although a public prosecutor, Castresana sued in his pri-
vate role as head of the Union of Progressive Prosecutors ("UFP").222 His com-
plaint alleged international crimes by the Argentine military, including torture,
terrorism, illegal detentions, disappearances, and genocide. He probably brought
the first formal case of "political genocide" anywhere in the world.223 Up until
then, the Genocide Convention's limitation of the concept of genocide to ethnic
mass slaughter had pretty much held sway with international lawyers, statespeo-
ple, and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"). Baltazar Garzon soon
would take Castresana's theory and run with it, arguing that the conventional
definition of genocide needed expansion.2 24
The Audiencia Nacional is the Spanish tribunal with original jurisdic-
tion over cases of such international character. 2 2 5 The Investigating Judge of the
Audiencia on duty the weekend that Castresana filed his complaint was Baltazar
Garzon. Garzon had made his reputation as a crusader against terrorists and cor-
rupt elites in government and business. In an interview, he claimed that he was
not looking for new projects.226 But he accepted the Argentine complaint and
became its fervent advocate.
Within months, a parallel coalition of Chilean exiles and progressive
Spanish lawyers filed their own acci6n popular with the Audiencia Nacional,
again with the Union of Progressive Prosecutors as the principal plaintiff.2 2 7 The
Audiencia Nacional lottery assigned the Chilean case to Judge Manuel Garcia-
221 While Spain does not permit in absentia criminal trials, a prosecution may commence with-
out the defendant present on Spanish soil. In such cases, extradition or voluntary appearance is
necessary to complete the case.
222 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 2.
223 While it is generally true that no "classical" ethnic genocide was present in the Argentine
case, necessitating the legally creative construction of a political genocide theory, Argentina's
Jewish community was indeed specially targeted by an oft anti-semitic (some would say Nazi-
influenced) military. Argentine Jewish victims of torture, disappearance, and murder significantly
exceeded the Jewish proportion of the population. Id. at 134. Also, the junta and its allies engaged
in explicitly racist rhetoric against the country's Jewish population. Id.
Ironically, in one of the German passive personality prosecutions against the junta's enforcers, the
German prosecutor initially rejected the standing of an Argentine of German-Jewish heritage
(while retaining other German-Argentine plaintiffs) because the Nazis had stripped the Jewish
family of German citizenship before their flight to Argentina during World War II. A higher Ger-
man tribunal thoughtfully disagreed, as did German public opinion. Id. at 135.
224 Id. at 2, 8, 48.
225 Royal Decree of 1977 for the Creation of the Audiencia Nacional (B.O.E. 1977, 172)
(Spain).
226 See Meisler, supra note 6.
227 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 13.
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Castellon.2 28 The Argentine and Chilean cases at first proceeded on parallel
paths, with Judges Garzon and Garcia-Castellon each conducting his own inves-
tigation.
Between 1996 and 1998, significant factual connections began to
emerge between the initially distinct Argentine and Chilean litigations. Judge
Garzon had uncovered significant evidence of an "Operation Condor" linking
the cases. 22 9 As Garzon investigated the Argentine cases, he and his staff inter-
viewed hundreds of witnesses and read thousands of documents. They uncov-
ered a conspiracy that extended beyond Argentina and that linked their cases
with the Chilean ones. The military dictatorships of half a dozen South Ameri-
can countries (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay) had
agreed in the 1970s to share resources in their internal "wars" against their per-
ceived enemies. This made refuge for victims more difficult. It also made it eas-
ier for the regimes to "disappear" their purported enemies beyond the reach of
national judicial process, as weakened as that was. Illegal detentions became
transnational. A political refugee from Pinochet could find herself detained by
the security forces in Buenos Aires. 2 30 Because Direcci6n de Inteligencia
Nacional ("DINA"), Pinochet's secret police, helped lead this effort, Garzon's
investigations expanded beyond the borders of Argentina to include events in
Chile. 23 1 Then Pinochet came to England.
Pinochet arrived in London for medical treatment on September 23,
1998.232 No longer Chilean head of state, he came as a private citizen, although
his lawyers would try to argue otherwise. Chilean exile groups got wind of his
presence at a private clinic and began a battle on two fronts-public opinion and
the courts.
Human rights advocates organized demonstrations at the hospital, catch-
ing the zeitgeist of a sympathetic Britain in a transition of its own from a dozen
years of Thatcherism to a new Labor Party government more vocally supportive
of international humanitarian causes.233 Thatcher and her allies sprang to Pino-
chet's defense,234 but their views no longer dominated British public discourse.
The Chileans and their allies lobbied the cautiously sympathetic Labor govern-
ment and particularly Home Secretary Jack Straw, the man responsible for any
ultimate extradition order by the British government.
228 Id. at 25.
229 Richard J. Wilson, The Spanish Proceedings, in THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF
AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 23-25 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000).
230 See generally ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5.
231 Id. at 25.
232 Id. at 1-2.
233 Pinochet Row Escalates, BBC NEWS, (Oct. 25, 1998)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/200999.stm.
234 Reed Brody, The Case ofAugusto Pinochet, in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 229, at 9.
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Additionally, allies from the Argentine litigation joined in, as Garzon
took the lead in securing an English 2 35 warrant against Pinochet. In the last days
before Pinochet's expected departure from Britain, Judge Garzon, the investigat-
ing magistrate on the Argentine case, was more accessible or willing than Judge
Garcia-Castellon, the investigating magistrate in the Chilean case. On Friday,
October 16, 1998, Garzon prepared the Spanish warrant that led to an English
warrant for Pinochet's arrest.2 36 Garzon linked Pinochet through Operation
Condor to the Argentine detention and disappearance of Edgardo Enriqez, a
Chilean opponent of Pinochet. He further accused Pinochet of genocide and
terrorism against further unidentified victims based on the Condor investigation.
English Magistrate Nicolas Evans of the Bow Street Courts in London issued an
arrest warrant against the general for "murder [of] Spanish citizens in Chile."237
English police served the arrest warrant on Pinochet in his private hospital suite,
a couple days before his hurriedly scheduled departure from Britain was to oc-
cur.
With the connections between the Chilean and Argentine cases so
strong and with Garzon already in the lead gathering evidence and pursuing
international procedures, Judge Garcia-Castellon decided to hand his Chilean
portfolio over to Garzon, who would thenceforth coordinate the two sets of cas-
es.
International support flowed in for the prosecution and extradition, not
merely from the expected NGOs, but from the EU and the UN (sort of). The
EU's Parliament passed a resolution on October 20 supporting the Spanish and
English procedures against Pinochet. 2 38 The UN Committee on Torture resolved
similar support a month later.2 39 German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher ob-
served approvingly, "Dictators are not above the law." 24 0
235 While generally "British" not "English" would be the correct word to describe United King-
dom interactions with other states in international relations, that is not so here. English law and
English courts are separate from their Scottish counterparts within the United Kingdom. English
law and English courts controlled this extradition case.
236 Phillipe Sands, 10 Years of the Pinochet Principle, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2008, 05:30 EDT),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/1 6/pinochet-law.
237 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 35, 41. The doctrine of dual criminality (that to be an ex-
traditable offense an act must be a crime in both the requesting state and the custodial state) re-
quired Magistrate Evans to characterize Garzon's factual charges as one or more English crimes-
he chose "murder," a characterization that would require some legal amendment as discussed
below. See id. at 41.
238 Resolution on the Arrest of General Pinochet in London, DATABASE EUR. L., http.//eur-
law.eu/EN/Resolution-arrest-General-Pinochet-London,193858,d (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
239 UN Torture Committee Calls for Pinochet Prosecution and Reforms in Northern Ireland,
AMNESTY INT'L (Nov. 19, 1998),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/027/1998/en/73da28e8-e7ef- 11 dd-a526-
05dcl810b803/eur450271998en.html. UN committees are not law-making or adjudicative bod-
ies-so their resolutions have little legal weight.
240 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 37.
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Garzon rewrote the arrest warrant and submitted it on October 22.241
The rewritten second warrant based charges on instances of torture, hostage-
taking, and murder consistent with dates after which the United Kingdom had
enacted into domestic law provisions of the relevant international conventions.
Since the United Kingdom had not enacted executed provisions of the Genocide
Convention into its national law, 24 2 that crime was dropped from the extradition
proceedings. A new English trial judge, Bow Street Magistrate Ronald Bartle,
approved Garzon's rewritten warrant as an English order, satisfied that the dou-
ble criminality requirement (that the alleged extraditable acts were crimes under
both Spanish and English law) was now met. Bartle would continue as the trial
judge in the extradition case. The Crown Prosecution Service ("CPS") would
represent the Spanish government (or more accurately, the Spanish state, given
the conservative Aznar government's ambivalence).243
Pinochet's lawyers appealed Bartle's warrant to the English High Court.
The High Court ruled on October 28, 1998. While it found the second warrant
(Bartle's) valid, it went on to find immunity for Pinochet. 2 44 The CPS then ap-
pealed to the House of Lords, Britain's highest court.2 45
Meanwhile, proceedings were continuing in Spain. The original 1996
Spanish complaints in both the Argentine and Chilean cases met with little or no
official opposition, largely because they were filed during the transition from
the Gonzales (Socialist) to the Aznar (conservative Partido Popular) govern-
ment.246 Gonzales (though an enemy of fellow left-winger Garzon) was out of
power. Right-wing Aznar was not about to undermine his own democratic cre-
dentials by appearing to support former rightist dictators. Also, Aznar had not
yet installed his own Public Prosecutor and the mildly progressive prosecutor
remaining from the Socialist government was not inclined to oppose the cases at
the outset of judicial proceedings in 1996.247 By October 1998, things had
changed substantially.
241 HERALDO MuRoz, THE DICTATOR'S SHADOW: LIFE UNDER AUGUSTO PINOCHET 256 (Basic
Books 2008).
242 The United Kingdom is a "dualist" state. Its unwritten constitution considers national and
international law as totally separate legal systems. Thus, the United Kingdom might assume inter-
national treaty obligations by act of its government, but such rules are not enforceable in British
courts until enacted by Parliament. Although the count of genocide disappeared from the English
case, it would continue to be of significance in Spanish court. See the discussion, infra, of "social
groups" in Spanish law and political genocide.
243 Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
415, 424-25 (2000).
244 Decision ofthe High Court ofJustice for England and Wales, 28 October 1998, reprinted in
THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 229, at 71-93.
245 See R v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, [1998] UKHL 41, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ldl99899/ldjudgmt/jd981125/pinoOl.htm.
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The new Aznar-appointed Public Prosecutor for the Audiencia Nacion-
al, Eduardo Fungairino, suspected by many of harboring anti-democratic Fran-
coist sympathies, opposed the cases administratively at first.2 48 When they failed
to "go away" and Pinochet's extradition became a real possibility, he appealed
them to the Criminal Appeals Chamber of the Audiencia Nacional.24 9 In early
November 1998, in the midst of the English proceedings, the Spanish appeals
court upheld the legality of the cases under Spanish law. 25 0
The Audiencia's appeals tribunal found the genocide, terrorism, and tor-
ture charges legally cognizable under Spain's universal jurisdiction statute. 251 It
further held that neither the Chilean nor Argentine amnesty laws would insulate
the defendants from these human rights prosecutions in Spanish court. The Oc-
tober 30 ruling was pretty much a grand slam for Garzon: the Audiencia panel
accepted his broad definition of genocide to include elimination of political
groups; it found that the kinds of international crimes alleged were not only out-
lawed by particular treaties and statutes at issue, but that they had been outlawed
prior to those such documents by customary law; and it found that all of the
persecutor's defenses of immunity and amnesty were insufficient.
On November 4, five days after the ruling by the Criminal Appeals
Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional, the House of Lords held its first
session in the Pinochet case.
The House of Lords vindicated the theory of the Spanish lawyers.
Twice. This highest British tribunal, one of the most prestigious courts in the
world, affirmed the Nuremberg principle that no one is immune to prosecution
for certain crimes against humanity and that, therefore, Pinochet's extradition
from England to Spain was permissible.
The first House of Lords' decision came down on November 25, 1998.
Three of the five Lords on the panel ruled against Pinochet and held that extra-
dition could proceed.252 This first decision R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipen-
diary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte ("Pinochet No. 1",)253 was set aside
by the Lords on December 17 ("Pinochet No. 2",)254 after a controversy arose




251 Order of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional affirming Spain's Juris-
diction, 5 November 1998, reprinted in THE PTNOCHET PAPERS, supra note 229, at 95-108.
252 Unlike most national supreme tribunals, the House of Lords does not issue a consolidated
opinion of the court. One must read through the individual Lords' opinions to discern what exactly
has been decided on what issues.
253 R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 61,
[1998] 4 All ER 897, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (Eng.) [hereinafter Pinochet No. 1].
254 R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 119,
[1999] 1 All ER 577, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272 (Eng.) [hereinafter Pinochet No. 2].
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2 256Hoffman.2 55 His wife had worked for one of the interveners in the case, Am
nesty International, and Lord Hoffman himself was an unpaid director and
chairman of an Amnesty International-related charity. 2 57 Although Pinochet No.
1 lacks any legal precedent, its few weeks of authority permitted significant
executive action by the United Kingdom government. By early December,
based on Pinochet No. 1, Jack Straw had issued an "authority to proceed" be-
ginning the actual extradition process. In a detailed assessment of the case,
Straw found no legal obstacles to extradition and found Pinochet fully fit to
stand trial.258 In view of Straw's later actions, this was significant.
A newly constituted panel of seven Law Lords heard arguments during
the last two weeks of January 1999. They announced their decision on March 24
(Pinochet No. 3).259 It was not as broad as Pinochet No. 1, particularly on the
question of "dual-criminality," to the disappointment of the human rights coali-
tion and prosecutors. But it did allow extradition to go forward, and it did make
international law history.
Regarding dual-criminality, the Lords held that to extradite from the
United Kingdom, the alleged acts must be criminal under British law on the date
they occurred, not merely on the date extradition was requested. Since Britain
did not ratify the Torture Convention and legislatively enact its provisions until
1988, the bulk of Pinochet's alleged crimes (occurring from the early 1970s
onward) would not be extraditable offenses. A few post-1988 allegations re-
mained, however, so those were extraditable offenses according to the Lords.260
On the issue of immunity, the Lords divided in various directions, but
the majority agreed that, in these circumstances, Pinochet had no immunity.
Four of the seven Lords (with different reasoning) held that systemic torture as
an instrument of state policy could never be covered by head-of-state immuni-
ty.261 Two more felt that Chile had waived immunity by ratifying the Torture
Convention. Thus, only one judge of the seven opined that Pinochet had immun-
ity.262 The extradition was legally permissible.
Home Secretary Straw reissued the authority to proceed on April 15,
1999. The British government was still on board. Some critics suspect that
255 The Rt. Hon. Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, The Rule of Law Legacy
of the House ofLords' Pinochet Judgments, 43 INT'L LAW. 45, 46 (2009).
256 Pinochet No. 2, supra note 254. See also Janie Wilson & Nick Hopkins, Pinochet Law Lord
Linked to Amnesty, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 1998, 10:35 EDT),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/l998/dec/08/pinochet.chile.
257 Lord Hope, supra note 255, at 45.
258 Jack Straw, Reasons for Authority to Proceed by Secretary of State Jack Straw, 9 December
1998, reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 229, at 183-87.
259 Lord Hope, supra note 255, at 46; Pinochet No. 3, [2000] 1 AC 147, [1999] 2 All ER 97,
[1999] 2 WLR 827.
260 Lord Hope, supra note 255, at 46-48.
261 Id.
262 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 56-57.
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something political transpired over the summer to change that government
commitment to extradition.2 63
The next legal step was taken in Judge Bartle's court on Bow Street in
London in late September-the extradition hearing itself.264 Over the summer,
Garzon had strengthened his factual case by gathering further evidence of post-
1988 wrongdoing to bolster the charges that were now time-limited by the
Lords' decision in Pinochet No. 2. Bartle's ruling no doubt pleased Garzon and
his allies. Since it was a single opinion, it could be clearer than the seven-part
disharmony from the House of Lords. He upheld the extradition.265 But he went
further. Bartle re-extended the relevant time-horizon for wrongdoing by holding
that since conspiracy is a continuing crime, events prior to 1988 could be con-
sidered where they were part of a conspiracy that continued past that date. He
also accepted that the trial court in Spain could fairly examine allegations that
Pinochet continued to inflict mental torture on the families of the disappeared
after 1988 by withholding the truth about their status. 2 66
With such a solid approval of extradition in Bartle's court, Pinochet's
strategists seemed to shift direction. Instead of concentrating on further appeals,
they played the humanitarian card. Pinochet had wanted a legal victory, not re-
lease based on infirmity. But by fall 1999, the latter was beginning to seem his
only hope.
After twice ordering extradition (after each of the two House of Lords'
decisions) Jack Straw changed his mind. In late fall of 1999, the Chilean gov-
ernment "convinced" Straw to order medical tests of Pinochet to determine
whether he was fit to stand trial.2 6 7 A government-appointed panel concluded
(after just a few hours of the tests) that Pinochet had diminished capacity to un-
derstand and communicate and was not fit for trial.268 The report was kept con-
fidential. On January 11, 2000, Straw announced that he intended to allow Pino-
chet to return to Chile on humanitarian grounds. 2 69 The Aznar government in
Spain immediately accepted the decision, pulling the rug out from under Gar-
zon.
Pinochet flew home to Chile on March 3.
263 Lord Hope, supra note 255, at 49; ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 64.
264 Ray Moseley, Extradition Hearing for Pinochet Begins, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 28, 1999,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-09-28/news/9909280062_1pinochet-lawyer-clive-
nicholls-torture-and-conspiracy-chilean-court (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
265 The Extradition of General Augusto Pinochet, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/10/14/extradition-general-augusto-pinochet (last visited Feb. 22,
2012).
266 Id
267 See Marlise Simons, Spanish Newspapers Disclose Secret Pinochet Health Report, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2000), available at 2000 WLNR 3281681.
268 Id
269 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 61-62.
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One assumes that the politics of Straw's about-face were as follows.
Chile had evolved its position on Pinochet from an absolute sovereignty defense
to a promise to try the dictator itself. Thus, the specter of impunity was dimin-
ished. If Chile's assurances were genuine, there was even a human rights argu-
ment for returning the accused to justice at the hands of his own countrymen.
United Kingdom relations with Chile and other Latin states would be improved
by the return. Britain's Labor government was anxious to aid Chile's Socialist
Party, hoping for electoral victory that year, and such a resolution of the Pino-
chet case seemed to promote this outcome. Finally, press reports had indicated
that a deal was done over the summer of 1999 among the Chilean, Spanish, and
British governments to return Pinochet through humanitarian discretion if the
English courts failed to release him and if the Spanish government could not
comfortably drop the suit.27 0 Straw reversed field between spring and fall of
1999-a summer deal would explain the timing.
So Pinochet went home, but the ghost of Franco was disturbed.
At the time of Augusto Pinochet's London arrest, Chile's President Frei
(sensitive to present Chilean sovereignty as well as, perhaps, past Spanish colo-
nialism) accused prosecutors of hypocrisy, asking why they were going after
Pinochet while having let Franco's crimes in their own homeland go unex-
amined.271 His reaction missed the mark. The political genocide case against
Pinochet did indict Franco-albeit allegorically. The Pact of Forgetting dis-
cussed by Jesus and me three years before in Seville, and tacitly accepted as part
of Spain's ongoing democratic transition, mandated indirection when accusing
Franco. The Spanish investigating judges were smart people familiar with their
own history-they could not have missed the political metaphor imbedded in
their actions.
B. Beyond Pinochet: Spain Prosecutes More Spanish-American Tyrants
1. The Scilingo case
Months prior to the filing of the Argentine case in Spain, Adolfo Scilin-
go made headlines in Buenos Aires by confessing his involvement in one of the
sorts of illegal abuse that formed the basis of that case. On April 2, 1995, Mike
Wallace interviewed Scilingo on 60 Minutes, turning the story into an interna-
tional horror story (and, as it turned out, plowing the ground for the Spanish
270 The Aznar regime floated the idea of accepting a Chilean request to turn the extradition case
over to arbitration (where a panel presumably would be chosen by the two governments both
opposed to extradition). Outraged opposition in the Spanish press and parliament stopped that
idea. ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 59-60.
271 Id. at 37.
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suits to come). 272 This Argentine navy captain had participated in the "death
flights" during which prisoners of the regime were murdered by throwing them,
naked and drugged, out of airplanes over the Atlantic Ocean. Scilingo cooper-
ated with Spanish investigators. While in Spain, Garzon placed him under ar-
rest. 27 3 He was convicted of crimes against humanity as a result of his own tes-
timony.274 He now serves multiple lengthy terms in Spanish prison, effectively a
life sentence.275 Ironically, he was the only Condor defendant ever convicted
under Spain's universal jurisdiction rule, after having been the only one to have
offered any cooperation or repentance.
2. The Cavallo case in Mexico and Spain
Ricardo Miguel Cavallo worked for the Argentine junta at the notorious
Naval Mechanics School (EMSA).27 6 He identified and arrested citizens target-
ed by the military for detention and its unpleasant consequences. He tortured
political prisoners. He ran the "Fish Tank" where slave labor prisoners repaired
electronic equipment, assisted in collecting information on perceived subver-
sion, forged documents, and worked as janitors. At least they usually sur-
vived.277 With the end of the junta days, Cavallo parlayed his technical and se-
curity skills into an international consulting business. This work brought him to
Mexico to create an electronic car registry to combat rampant auto theft.
The Mexican ministry sponsoring Cavallo's scheme ran television spots
in mid-2000 featuring him as its huckster to a skeptical Mexican public. Acting
on tips from viewers that recognized the transformed concentration camp opera-
tive from their own unpleasant interactions at ESMA, the Mexican newspaper
Reforma investigated.27 8 The newspaper's staff in Buenos Aires looked hard,
found witnesses and evidence, and eventually connected the dots. Cavallo the
272 MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE LEGACIES OF
TORTURE 230 (2011) (citing 60 Minutes: Tales from the Dirty War (CBS television broadcast
April 2, 1995)).
The "Scilingo Effect" became the description of a flurry of public confessions by Argentine per-
secutors. See id. at 194.
273 Giles Tremlett, Argentinian Jailed for Throwing Prisoners from Plane, GUARDIAN, April




276 Cavallo, Ricardo, HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/7/226.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
277 The Fish Tank evokes Solzhenitsyn's epic book, THE FIRST CIRCLE, describing a Soviet
work camp for technical specialists. See ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN, THE FIRST CIRCLE (Harper
& Row 1968).
278 Peter Greste, Mexico Boss Held on Torture Charges, BBC News, Aug. 25, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/895259.stm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
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businessman apparently was Cavallo the bad guy from the EMSA Spain re-
quested Cavallo's extradition.
The Mexican Foreign Ministry granted the extradition request after re-
279 280
ceiving federal Judge Jesus Guadalupe Luna's consultative opinion.
The Mexican Supreme Court upheld the extradition order of the foreign
ministry in an amparo proceeding.28' Amparo allows a party to bring a collateral
attack (somewhat similar to habeas corpus) against an action by the Mexican
state that allegedly denies the party some fundamental right under Mexican
law.282 The Supreme Court found no such rights violated, so on June 10, 2003, it
approved his extradition to Spain, which the government then carried out.2 8 3 The
decision was monumental. Mexico became the first country to extradite a de-
fendant to another state for crimes committed in a third state, based on universal
jurisdiction.
Cavallo remains in Spanish custody as of this writing.
3. The Rios-Montt case
Spain's highest court embraces pure universal jurisdiction. In Septem-
ber 2005, almost a decade after proponents of Pinochet's prosecution began
their legal campaign in Spain, that country's Constitutional Court delivered a
landmark opinion regarding universal jurisdiction: it affirmed the right of its
national judges to pursue284 charges against gross human rights abusers, even
279 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 147.
280 The case presented a delicate balancing of policies for the Mexican government. On the one
hand it wanted to act on the side of international human rights for which Mexico has long been a
strong advocate (notwithstanding some spots on its own domestic record). On the other hand, the
Mexican government vehemently promotes the doctrines of state sovereignty and non-
interference, a historic consequence of abuses of its own sovereignty by the United States. The
former policy would militate toward extradition of Cavallo to Spain, the latter toward refusal of
extradition in deference to Argentine wishes. Newly elected President Vincente Fox, the first
Mexican president in 70 years from a party other than the long-dominant PRI (Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party), had recently appointed well-known author and political analyst Jorge Castaneda
as Foreign Minister. Some believe the winds of change represented by Fox and Castenada were
favorable for this decision that elevated human rights over traditional Mexican sovereignty con-
cerns. Juan E. Mendez & Salvador Tinajero-Esquivel, The Cavallo Case: A New Test for Univer-
sal Jurisdiction, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2001, at 5 (2001), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/08/3cavallo.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012); ROHT-ARRIAZA,
supra note 5, at 147; Interview with Jose de Jesus Ortega de la Pena, Mexican Federal Appeals
Court Judge (Mar. 14, 2011). "Poor Mexico-so far from God, and so close to the United States,"
the saying goes. Cited by Ortega and various other Mexican friends and colleagues.
281 Quejoso: Ricardo Miguel Cavallo Amparo en Revision, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justi-
cia de la Nacion [SCJN] [Supreme Court],10 Junio 2003, Tesis P./J. 140/2002 (Mex.).
282 Mendez & Tinajero-Esquivel, supra note 280, at 8.
283 Cavallo, Tesis P/J. 140/2002.
284 Not only are Civil Law judges generally more active players (than Common Law judges) in
the inquisitorial system of criminal trials followed in their jurisdictions, but in some countries like
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for events that occurred abroad and even where no parties were Spanish.2 85 The
Rios-Montt 286 case allowed the prosecution, in Spain under Spanish law, 28 7 of
Guatemalan strongman Efrain Rios-Montt. Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta
Menchis Turn had charged him with genocide and other abuses against indige-
nous Guatemalans (including her family), committed solely in Guatemala.288
With no factual links to Spain, this case presented Spanish courts with
claims under "pure" universal jurisdiction theory. Spain's Constitutional Tribu-
nal validated the Garzonian view that crimes against humanity could be prose-
cuted by any nation against any international criminal. Universal jurisdiction
thus waxed full and bright in Spain in 2005.289
VIII. THE WANE IN SPAIN OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The significance and practice of universal jurisdiction by Spanish courts
waned after 2005. A number of factors contributed to this trend-the increasing
activity of international tribunals, the willingness of individual emerging de-
mocracies to prosecute their own former dictators and cohorts, the diminished
credibility of extra-territorial prosecutions due to politicization and failed cases,
foreign relations difficulties, the election of Socialist President Zapatero and the
opening of direct criticism of the Franco regime.
Spain they exercise prosecutorial powers (shared with separate executive branch prosecutors), as
had Baltazar Garzon in the history to be narrated here.
285 Guatemala Genocide Case, S.T.S., Sept. 9, 2005 (Boletin Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.], No.
258, p. 45), available at
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/basesdatos/doc.php?coleccion-tc&id=SENTENCIA-2005-
0237 (decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the Guatemalan Genocide case upholding
universal jurisdiction in Spain).
286 Id.
287 Here the law of Spain incorporates International Law. Constituci6n Espaflola [C.E.] art. 122,
(B.O.E. 1978, n. 311) (Spain) (incorporating the jurisdictional provisions of the Organic Law on
Judicial Power into the Constitution); Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] [Law on the
Judiciary] art. 23.4 (B.O.E. 1985, 157) (Spain).
288 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Prosecuting Genocide in Guatemala: The Case Before the Spanish
Courts and the Limits to Extradition 3 (George Mason University Project on Human Rights,
Global Justice & Democracy, Working Paper No. 2, 2009) (citing Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n
No 1, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid, Dil Previas 331/99, Auto de 27 Marzo de 2000), available at
http://cgs.gmu.edulpublications/hjd/hjdwp_2.pdf
289 The actual prosecution of Rios-Montt in Spain went nowhere because the Guatemalan gov-
ernment refused to extradite him. However, the "Pinochet Effect" worked again and, just at the
time of this writing, a Guatemalan court is itself pursuing the prosecution of Rios Montt for the
charges of genocide and other crimes against humanity similar to those brought in Spain. Danilo
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A. International Tribunals
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 ironically unlocked the
gates to new human rights violations in central and Eastern Europe, most terri-
bly in former Yugoslavia. 29 0 Then even more horrific violations occurred in
Rwanda. These circumstances contributed to the (somewhat) effective reasser-
tion of universal jurisdiction for the first time after more than four Cold War
decades since Nuremberg.
Universal jurisdiction reemerged in the 1990s on two fronts. First, the
global community, now unfettered by Soviet/Western political stalemate,2 91
began to create international criminal tribunals. Second, progressive legislators
and jurists moved their individual states toward the assertion of criminal juris-
diction over serious human rights violations beyond their borders. The Yugoslav
and Rwanda tribunals created by the UN Security Council and the proposed
International Criminal Court exemplified the former trend. Extraterritorial pros-
ecutions by Spain and Belgium exemplified the latter.292
However, by the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, the Rome
Treaty for the International Criminal Court had come into effect,293 and the UN
had helped create "mixed" international tribunals with local state participation
(e.g., Cambodia and Sierra Leone). Added to the decade of work by the Yugo-
slav and Rwanda Tribunals, this international judicial activity diminished the
perceived need for ad hoc and unilateral prosecutions by states like Spain that
were not connected to the human rights violations alleged.294
290 President Tito, the mostly popular Yugoslav dictator for decades after World War II (during
which Tito had been a hero leading partisans against Nazi occupation) successfully muted nation-
alist tendencies within the six component Yugoslav republics. After the Berlin Wall dominoes
began to fall, nationalists in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia demanded independence from the Serb-
dominated federation. Serbia's leaders reacted with repression and strident nationalism of their
own. All this led to civil war and gross human rights abuses. The UN Security Council created the
International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia ("ITFY") to try such abuses-the first such intema-
tionally sanctioned court since the Nuremberg era.
291 Of course, part of such Cold War stalemate was reciprocally blocking vetoes at the UN
Security Council. Only after the Cold War ended would Russia, China, France, Britain, and the
US find it politically palatable to cooperatively create war crimes tribunals by Security Council
action.
292 From a different procedural angle, expanding lawsuits in the US under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute reflected this movement on the civil side of the docket.
293 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinaf-
ter "Rome Statute"); NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 5, at 173.
294 See REYDAMS, supra note 198, at 40.
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B. The Pinochet Effect 295
The Spanish prosecutions laid the foundation for their own future re-
dundancy. Within a few years of Garzon's 1998 attempt to extradite Pinochet
from Britain and the House of Lords' momentous opinion affirming the legality
of such extradition, cases against homegrown tyrants commenced in Chile, Ar-
gentina, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Peru. The Chilean government initially criti-
cized Spain for the prosecution of Pinochet, citing its sovereignty and Spain's
hypocrisy (i.e., its Franco amnesia).2 96
However, the Pinochet case in fact broke the ice jam of impunity built
up by numerous immunity laws forced on the weak, fledgling, Latin American
democracies, which emerged in the 1980s under the threatening shadow of un-
repentant militaries. The Pinochet prosecution gave courage to victims, legisla-
tors, attomeys, and judges. They saw global support. They saw Pinochet as a
weak old bully, no longer protectable by his colonels.
But the commencement of Latin American cases in home courts, ena-
bled by new legislative thrusts, trumping under-the-gun immunity laws with
new human rights legislation, moved primary jurisdiction for such matters back
to home ground-a forum more convenient and appropriate than Spanish or
Belgian tribunals. One might also speculate that a further impact on Spanish
assertions of universal jurisdiction was the growth of robust democracy in Latin
America and the passage of time, shrinking the pool of dictators to prosecute.
C. Diminished Credibility
Failed prosecutions and politicization both have weakened the credibil-
ity of Spanish universal jurisdiction practice.
Spanish prosecutors only have succeeded in convicting one Latin Amer-
ican gross human rights abuser, Alberto Scilingo,2 97 of the dozens of persons
investigated during the decade between their attempt to extradite Pinochet and
the Cortes ending pure universal jurisdiction in Spain.29 8 Supporters of such
jurisdiction likely would argue that conviction statistics do not fairly measure
the value of these judicial efforts. For example, the Pinochet extradition effort
birthed the House of Lords opinion that signaled the international legal respon-
sibility of former heads of state for major human rights crimes. It was a land-
mark ruling from one of the world's most respected tribunals. The Lords set
new substantive precedent (or perhaps revived dormant Nuremberg precedent),
295 The reader will note that this subpart shares its title with Naomi Roht-Arriaza's excellent
book. Needless to say, her text deals with this subject much more comprehensively than this small
portion of my Article. Hers is a definitive work and has been quite valuable in furthering my
research for this Article.
296 For the Frei/Garzon dialogue see supra Part VI.
297 See supra Part Vll.B. 1.
298 Cavallo still awaits trial. See supra Part VII.B.2.
882 [Vol. 114
58
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss3/5
THE WANE IN SPAIN
gave courage (notwithstanding threatening militaries) to prosecutors and legisla-
tors in Chile and elsewhere to seek justice against former persecutors, and stim-
ulated further exercises of international jurisdiction. And, perhaps, such judicial
activity has chilled some misbehavior by contemporary tyrants. But most of the
failed Spanish prosecutions ended with small effect, in procedural obscurity.
Furthermore, politics harmed the credibility of the Spanish investiga-
tions. In Spain, private parties may initiate criminal investigations.299 Therefore,
any group or individual with a political axe to grind may prompt an investiga-
tion to be opened. They may target democratic governments like the United
States, Britain, and Israel to further political aims. Universal jurisdiction is
strongest when there is global moral consensus, as with an Eichmann or a Pino-
chet. It is diminished otherwise.
D. Foreign Relations Difficulties
The government of Chile objected almost immediately upon Spain's ef-
forts to extradite Pinochet from the United Kingdom. Not only did the process
strain Spanish relations with Chile, but it placed Spain's EU ally, Britain, in an
awkward position regarding its own posture toward Chile's sovereignty objec-
tions.3 00
Diplomatic tension arose when Spanish prosecutors opened a case
against China regarding Tibet in January 2006. To critics, the Spanish investi-
gating judges continued their trek further afield and against diplomatic common
sense when they opened investigations against the Bush administration regard-
ing activities related to the Iraq and Afghan wars.30 1 The Spanish investigation
302
of Israel's actions during the Gaza conflict raised similar strains. Unlike the
Pinochet case, the Chinese, American, and Israeli cases involved no Spanish
nationals, so critics could claim even greater overreaching. Furthermore, they
went beyond Spain's arguable "orbit" into which the Spanish-American cases
seemed to fall.
299 See the discussion of the accion popular, supra Part VII.A.
300 The exercise of unilateral universal jurisdiction by a national court regarding acts in another
state at least raises the issue of violation by the litigating state of its international law duty not to
interfere in the internal affairs of another sovereign. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. See also
REYDAMS, supra note 198, at 42. Thus, even if gross human rights violations fall outside this rule
(as not "internal affairs") or constitute a legal exception to the rule, the rule itself still evidences
that political sensitivity facing the prosecuting state.
301 Baltasar Garzon initiated an investigation of the Bush Justice Department for allegations of
torture in Spring 2009.
302 The investigation of Israel's actions during the Gaza conflict was initiated in January 2009.
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E. Breaching the Pact ofForgetting and Reclamation of Memory
The prosecution of Pinochet put a crack in the cemented memory of the
Civil War and the four-decade Francoist era that followed. The election of Zapa-
tero in 2004 began the shattering of that amnesiac encasement. Groups of Re-
publican victims' families and supporters had organized and gained some
strength in the years preceding the Zapatero victory.303 Their confidence to
begin challenging the Pact of Forgetting was no doubt enhanced by the example
of Garzon and his colleagues in prosecuting foreign tyrants with rdsum6s similar
to Franco's. Even before Garzon's prosecutions, by the early 1990s, with de-
mocracy entrenched and the military less threatening and reactionary, such
families had begun to demand accounting for Francoist abuses.
Observers disagree who broke the Pact of Forgetting and when. Some
claim that Garzon did in October 2008 when he filed his aborted judicial war-
rant to investigate Franco-era disappearances.304 Others attribute the rupture to
Zapatero. Zapatero declared 2006 as the Year of Historic Memory, a sign that
the Spanish government "ha[d] decisively broken with the 'Pact of Forget-
ting."' 301 More formally, Zapatero's 2007 Law for the Recovery of Historical
Memory "shatter[ed] the pact of forgetting" according to The Economist.306
Omar Encarnacion reaches further back to 1998: "The worldwide reaction to
Pinochet's arrest destroyed Spain's unwritten 'Pact of Forgetting' that had made
the politically connected deaths of 580,000 Spaniards during Franco's reign
(1936-75) almost unmentionable." 3 0 7
Professor Encarnacion seems to have it right. Garzon and his Spanish
legal colleagues, as well as the Chilean and Argentine activists that prompted
the Spanish suits, are "to blame." Add to them the Spanish survivors of Franco
and families and friends of Franco's non-survivors-those who never "for-
303 See Giles Tremlett, Bringing Franco's Crimes to Light, GUARDIAN, July 16, 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/17/spain.gilestremlett; see also Paloma Aguilar, Col-
lective Memory of the Spanish Civil War: The Case ofPolitical Amnesty in the Spanish Transition
to Democracy (1996), available at
http://www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/publicaciones/working/archivos/l996_85.pdf. There were thus
popular and academic movements against the Pact of Forgetting before Zapatero's election.
304 Christine Spolar, Tortuous Path to Spain 's Painful Past, CHI. TRiB., Nov. 19, 2008, at 6,
available at 2008 WLNR 22062470.
305 Vance Holloway, Book Review, 33 ANALES DE LA LITERATURA ESPANOLA CONTEMPORANEA
193 (2008), available at 2008 WLNR 25485507. See also Thomas Catan, Country Ends Years of
Silence to Learn Lessons from the Civil War, TIMES (UK), July 15, 2006, at 47, available at 2006
WLNR 12206738; Isaac Rosa, A Bellyful of Memory, EL PAIS (ENGLISH), July 13, 2006, at 5,
available at 2006 WLNR 12035822 (criticizing discussion of historical memory in Spanish socie-
ty).
306 Spain's Past: A Rude Awakening, EcoNoMIST (Oct. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/9989965 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
307 Spain's Memory Wars, 32 WILSoN'S Q. 87 (2008), available at 2008 WLNR 25654619.
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got"-and one sees that Zapatero merely pried open a substantial crack already
chiseled in the wall of silence.
So Garzon's 1998 actions, not his aborted investigation of Franco a
decade later, were most instrumental in breaching the Silence. His 1998 dis-
claimers of any connection between the Latin American prosecutions in Spain
and Francoist crimes30 s seem disingenuous (or puckish). One suspects that the
Pact of Silence led to Spanish universal jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction
helped breach the Pact of Silence. Garzon's allegory was effective.
Those segments of Spanish society that have sought to reclaim memory
about the Civil War and its aftermath have successfully re-birthed history over
the last half decade. While descendants of Republican families, human rights
activists, and their allies have agitated for years,30 9 it is only with and since the
2004 election of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 310 that the state has articulated a
public critique of Francoism.
Baltazar Garzon and his fellow investigative judges prepared the way
for this ultimate breach in the Pact of Forgetting by their prosecutions of Latin
American despots. As mentioned above, when they began this work in the mid-
1990s they disclaimed any connection between such efforts and Franco.31' At
that time, just at the ascension of the conservative Aznar regime, both elites and
the public widely supported the Pact of Silence, crediting it for helping secure
the new democracy. So, a direct assault on the Pacto was not possible. Yet at-
tempting to hold tyranny legally accountable in Latin America, in Spanish
courts, surely encouraged opponents of the Spanish Silence and must have wor-
ried former Francoists. Ten years later (and thirty years after Franco's death)
few former Francoists or rightist generals remained-so the democracy-
preserving function of the Pact appeared diminished. Spain had fully integrated
into democratic Western Europe and its democracy was no longer fragile.
Zapatero did not campaign on the issue of holding Francoism accounta-
ble for its crimes. Such a tactic would not have won him many votes he did not
already have on the left. And it likely would have lost him votes he needed in
the center. His opponent Asnar's unpopular support for the Bush Administra-
308 See infra note 341.
309 The Association for Recovery of Historic Memory ("ARHM") is one of many groups which
has investigated (lobbied for government investigation of) Francoist crimes and what happened to
victims thereof since its founding in 2000 by respected Spanish academics and scientists. ARHM
is the most prominent of such groups, but individual efforts by survivor families preceded it.
310 The Socialists defeated the conservative Partido Popular ("PP") gaining 164 seats in the
Cortes' Chamber of Deputies to the PP's 148. This gave the Socialists a plurality in the Cortes.
With the additional support of minor parties, Zapatero obtained the Prime Minister's seat. Ed
McCullough, Socialists oust Spain's Conservatives After Election Overshadowed By Terror At-
tacks, AssocIATED PRESS, Mar. 15, 2004, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lPl-
92139391.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
311 In interviews in 1998, Garzon denied that his prosecution of Latin American human rights
violators had any relation to Franco. Meisler, supra note 6.
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tion's Iraq war was a major target of Zapatero's election campaign.3 12 Spanish
soldiers had died there. As if to dramatically emphasize this issue, Al Qaeda
bombed Madrid's main train station a few days before the polls. Aznar's clumsy
reaction to the violent tragedy (attempting without evidence to blame Basque
separatists and dodge the connection to his Iraq policy) assured Zapatero's vic-
tory. The specter of Franco had been nowhere on the election horizon.
The rapid social changes in Spanish society with the advent of Zapa-
tero's Socialist government (e.g., gender equality, gay rights, secularization) no
doubt encouraged the forces of memory-recovery. By the time of the election,
organized groups who sought accounting for disappeared family members under
the Franco regime, as well as equal recognition and benefits for Republican vet-
erans, were growing in size and confidence. In a nod to those groups, Zapatero
declared 2006 the Year of the Recovery of Historical Memory. The Law on
315Historical Memory further rewarded their efforts in 2007, legislatively
breaching the Pact of Silence and Forgetting.
Soon after coming to power Zapatero made his support for accountabil-
ity obvious. When Zapatero, the grandson3 16 of an army officer murdered by the
Nationalists, declared 2006 the "Year of Historical Memory," 317 he signaled
strong support for the survivors' organizations that were lobbying for redress of
Francoist persecution. Such demands included exhumation of unmarked Repub-
lican graves, removal of public Franciost monuments and symbols, accounting
of children stolen from Republican families for adoption by Nationalists, com-
pensation for victims, equalization of benefits for Republican veterans, re-
nationalization of refugees from Francoism and their descendants, and de-
legitimatization of convictions under Franco for political offenses.3 1 g
The Law on Historical Memory answered most of these demands. The
Cortes enacted it in the late fall of 2007. The statute condemns the Franco re-
gime, repeatedly referring to it as the "Dictatorship."3 19 It recognizes the victims
of the Civil War and the repression that followed under Franco320 and rejects as
312 Ed McCullough, Spain Votes Out War-backing Party: Incoming Leader Has Said He Will
Pull Troops Out of Iraq, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (WV), Mar. 15, 2004, at lA,
available at 2004 WLNR 1182835.
313 Id.
314 Javier Pradera, The Flip Side, EL PAIS (ENGLISH), June 29, 2006, at 2, available at 2006
WLNR 11225147.
315 Ley de Memoria Hist6rica [Law of Historical Memory] (B.O.E. 2007, 310) (Spain).
316 Lisa Abend & Geoff Pingree, Zapatero Steps Up, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 1, 2005, at 28, avail-
able at 2005 WLNR 5166590.
317 Pradera, supra note 314.
318 Andrew Greeley, Editorial, Dispute Over Power of the Church Still Reigns in Spain, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, May 4, 2007, at 41.
319 Law of Historical Memory, at art. 1.1.
320 Id. at art. 2.1.
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illegitimate laws passed and convictions reached against political opponents. 321
The government must offer help to relatives of disappeared victims of the war
and repression to locate and exhume the remains of such victims. 32 2 Surviving
victims and descendants of victims of the war and the repression may receive
certain compensation.323 The law grants Spanish citizenship to surviving mem-
bers of the International Brigades who volunteered for the Republic to fight the
Francoists.3 24 Those who fled the dictatorship and their descendants may return
to Spain and resume their citizenship, 325 a provision of the law that has led to
long lines at the Spanish consulate in Cuba.326 The memory law (with some
unintended irony) requires the removal of Francoist memorial symbols from
public buildings, exceptions permitted for artistic, architectural, or religious
reasons. A separate article prohibits Francoist activities at the Valley of the Fall-
en.3 27 It further mandates that this vast monument built by Franco to himself be
reoriented by its government caretakers to honor all victims of the Civil War
and the "repression" under Franco.
International law and institutions have supported breaking the Pacto de
Olvido and holding Francoism accountable for its misdeeds. International treaty
and custom require states to provide families of the politically "disappeared"
with reasonably discoverable information about the fate of their loved ones.328 A
policy that purposely frustrates such disclosure probably violates international
law. A UN Working Group in 2002 had urged Spain to investigate its Francoist
past, particularly the fate of disappeared victims.32 9 Amnesty International had
similarly expressed concern about lack of justice and reparations for the disap-
peared and their families. 33 0 Thus, by Zapatero's presidency, both international
organs and prominent NGOs were advocating memory recovery in Spain.
321 Id. at art. 3.
322 Id. at arts. 11-14.
323 Id. at arts. 5-9.
324 Id. at art. 18.
325 Id. at Seventh Additional Provision.
326 Rosa Tania Valdes & Esteban Israel, Cubans Line Up to Apply for Spanish Citizenship,
REUTERS, Dec. 29, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/29/us-cuba-spain-immigration-
idUSTRE4BS57I20081229 (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
327 See infra Part X.
328 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance art.
18, G.A. Res. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006) (Spain signed this treaty on Sept. 27, 2007, and
ratified it on Sept. 24, 2009).
329 Carlos E. Cu6, UN Group Backs Call for Government to Study Fates of Franco's Disap-
peared, EL PAIS (ENGLISH), Nov. 16, 2002, at 3, available at 2002 WLNR 186462. See also Omar
Encarnacion, Reconciliation after Democratization: Coping With the Past in Spain, 123 POL. SCI.
Q. 435, 450 (2008).
330 Ana I. Ariza L6pez, Historical Memory, EL PAIS (ENGLISH), Nov. 29, 2008, at 2, available
at 2008 WLNR 22850791. See also Amnesty Berates Madrid for "Lack of Progress" in Franco
Inquiries, EL PAIS (ENGLISH), May 28, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 10976108.
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F. Universal Jurisdiction Law Amended
The Spanish Cortes, in the summer of 2009, amended the statute that
had authorized universal jurisdiction, limiting proceedings to cases with a con-
nection to Spain or Spanish nationals. The statute now reads,
Sin perjuicio de lo que pudieran disponer los tratados y conven-
ios internacionales suscritos por Espafia, para que puedan
conocer los Tribunales espafioles de los anteriores delitos
deberd quedar acreditado que sus presuntos responsables se
encuentran en Espafia o que existen victimas de nacionalidad
espafiola, o constatarse algin vinculo de conexi6n relevante con
Espafia y, en todo caso, que en otro pais competente o en el
seno de un Tribunal intemacional no se ha iniciado procedi-
miento que suponga una investigaci6n y una persecuci6n efec-
tiva, en su caso, de tales hechos punibles.33 '
Thus, Spain followed Belgium in reacting both to diplomatic pressure and do-
mestic discomfort in barring its courts from pure universal jurisdiction prosecu-
tions. Significantly, this step back from universal jurisdiction was taken at the
very time that it had become acceptable within the country to openly demand
some sort of accounting for Francoist crimes against humanity. Criticizing Fran-
co indirectly (through universal jurisdiction cases against other dictators) no
longer was crucial to a nation that could openly remember his crimes.
IX. BALTAZAR IN WONDERLAND
Spain's democratic transition has entered its second stage. The frank
examination of past political sins represents a national maturity-a public men-
tality free of fear, either of domestic military intervention or civil strife, or so it
seemed until the rather odd prosecution of Baltazar Garzon.
Judge Ram6n Siez Valcdrcel notes with irony that the only person to be
prosecuted in relation to the many crimes of the Francoists is Baltazar Gar-
zon. 3 32 The case against him represents a strange climax to this tale of civil war,
repressed memory, and universal justice.
331 Ley Orgdnica 1/2009 art. I (B.O.E. 2009, 266) (Spain), available at
http://www.boe.esIboe/dias/2009/11/04/pdfs/BOE-A-2009-17492.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
Without prejudice to international treaties and conventions ratified by Spain, in order to take ju-
risdiction over the above offenses, it must be established that the alleged perpetrators are in Spain
or that victims have Spanish nationality or that there is some important connection with Spain;
and in any case, neither another jurisdiction nor international court has begun a procedure involv-
ing investigation and effective prosecution, if any, of such offenses.
332 Baltasar Garzdn v. Spain Background Document, INTERIGHTS 1, 6 (2011) (citing Ramon
Saez, Los Jueces y el Aprendizaje de la Impunidad, a proposito de los crimenes delfranquismo,
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Over his career, Garzon has made many enemies-rightists, leftists, and
apolitical bad guys. During his brief stint in politics, he broke with his Socialist
Party colleagues and disavowed the powerful, but increasingly corrupt regime of
Felipe Gonzales. He has prosecuted organized crime, corrupt officials, Basque
terrorists, Spanish security services, Islamist terrorists, Latin dictators, US gov-
ernment officials, and, most recently, dead Francoists. The latter investigations
have taken the zealous pursuit of justice too far for the taste of the majority of
the country's judicial establishment. The previous regime, dominated by the
sons of Francoists, appointed the bulk of that majority. Franco appointed a
number of its members himself.
Around the turn of the millennium, Spanish groups for the recovery of
memory began to demand accounting for their parents, grandparents, aunts, and
uncles who disappeared during the Civil War and Franco's dictatorship.33 3 And
sometimes they demanded accounting for non-relatives-spiritual and cultural
martyrs, like poet Lorca Garcia.334 The passage of a generation since Franco's
1975 death gave these petitioners temporal space. The establishment of a con-
sensus constitutional democracy, integrated into European political and econom-
ic structures, immunized them from renewed physical repression by police or
military. The metaphor scripted by Garzon and his allies in the prosecutions of
Pinochet, Scilingo, Cavallo, and Rios-Montt opened the ears of the nation to
airing of such grievances. These groups began to dig up mass graves, uncover-
ing Republican bones in the pursuit of closure regarding the last days of their
loved ones.
The memory-recovery movement increased in vigor through the first
decade of the new century. As discussed above, democracy was maturing, Zapa-
tero had been elected, and Franco had been denounced by the Cortes. Memory
activists approached Garzon to pursue their cause judicially. He agreed, opening
an investigation into hundreds of early Franco-era disappearances and kill-
ings, 3 naming Franco and dozens of the Caudillo's henchmen as perpetrators.
114 MIENTRAS TANTO 41 (2010) (Spain)), available at
http://www.interights.org/document/125/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
3 See Tremlett, supra note 80; see also Sara B. Miller, Spain Begins to Confront its Past, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0206/pO6sO1-
woam.html.
3 Relatives of Dioscoro Galindo, believed by them to have been murdered by a Nationalist
death squad and buried alongside Lorca and "two anarchist bullfighters," requested the opening of
that mass grave. Jestis Ruiz Mantilla, The Battle to Unearth Lorca's Grave, EL PAIS (ENGLISH),
Sep. 22, 2008, at 4, available at 2008 WLNR 17969844.
335 Giles Tremlett, Spanish civil war victims' bodies finally removed from mass grave, THE
GUARDIAN, May 5, 2011 available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/05/spanish-
civil-war-bodies-removed-mass-grave.
336 Spolar, supra note 35 (killings by Franco's government and his allied forces through 1951);
Brooks, supra note 34 (explaining an Amnesty International spokesperson claiming that disap-
pearances continuing thereafter constitute ongoing international crimes according to the UN
Commission on Human Rights).
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Initially, Garzon's opponents merely accused him of breaching the Pact
of Forgetting. 3 Interestingly, Manuel Fraga was one of those accusers. Fraga
complained that it was a "grave error to resuscitate this tragedy" and mocked
Garzon's efforts as "nonsensical."3 38 His criticism is the only public interchange
I have found between the two men.33 9 In fact, the Pact had been broken well
before this by Garzon and others, including Spain's democratically elected Pres-
ident.3 40
An obscure employee of the Madrid Post Office with Falangist politics
founded a labor union of unreported, but presumably limited, membership. That
union filed an accion popular against Garzon alleging that the judge had crimi-
nally breached his judicial duty by opening the investigation against Franco et
al. The complaint essentially argued that the Spanish Amnesty Law of 1977 so
clearly prohibited the Franco investigation that Garzon's actions blatantly and
knowingly violated the law.341
Whether an amnesty law could insulate perpetrators against human
rights prosecutions was apparently not debated in the Cortes or the press, an
issue that has become of interest during the present attempt to prosecute Judge
Garzon for violating that amnesty law by starting an inquiry into Franco-era
crimes. The question is all the more interesting in light of Spain's Constitution,
which generally elevates international law above domestic statutes.
To successfully convict a judge in such circumstances, one would need
to show that the investigation was knowingly and blatantly beyond his power-
a merely erroneous interpretation of legal authority by the accused judge would
not support such a charge.342 Garzon has two substantial legal arguments why
the 1977 Amnesty Law did not preclude his investigation. First, the Amnesty
Law excused only crimes committed prior to October 6, 1977.343 Because inter-
national law recognizes forced disappearances as continuing crimes against hu-
manity 3 4 (and because Spain's 1978 Constitution recognizes the supremacy of
international law over domestic statute),345 the investigation into the disappear-
ances is not reached by the Amnesty Law. Second, international law does not
33 Brooks, supra note 34.
338 Spolar, supra note 35.
3 "Dialogue" might overstate the reality since Garzon did not personally respond.
340 See Pradera, supra note 317.
341 Lisa Abend, Crusading Judge Faces His Own Trial in Spain, TIME WORLD, Apr. 7, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978412,00.html.
342 Baltasar Garzdn, supra note 332, at 6.
343 Ley de Amnistia [Amnesty Law] art. I (B.O.E. 1977, 248) (Spain), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1977/10/17/pdfs/A22765-22766.pdf.
344 International Convention, supra note 328, at art. 8.
345 Constituci6n Espailola, B.O.E. n. 311, 1978 (Spain) (explaining that Section 10 requires
provisions related to fundamental rights and liberties to be interpreted in accord with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties and agreements ratified by Spain, and
Section 96 incorporates validly concluded international treaties).
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recognize the legitimacy of amnesties purporting to excuse crimes against hu-
manity. Spain itself took this position in the Pinochet case and was confirmed in
its stance by the British House of Lords.
Regardless of whether both of Garzon's two substantive legal argu-
ments are correct, if either is at least reasonable, then he violated no law. If a
reasonable jurist could believe that the Amnesty Law did not prohibit investiga-
tion of Franco, then Garzon did not knowingly overstep his judicial power.
Curiously, the reviewing Spanish judiciary thus far has missed this ele-
mentary legal logic. It has permitted the Falangist case against Garzon to pro-
ceed and has embraced it as its own. Perhaps the situation appears less curious
when one examines the political composition of the judges judging the judge. 34 6
Either Franco's government or the 1996-2004 government of the Partido Popu-
lar (founded by the Francoist Fraga and now run by the sons of Francoists) ap-
pointed most of them.
The Spanish Supreme Court and the national judicial commission that
supervises all judges both have permitted the prosecution against Garzon to pro-
ceed. The latter body has suspended him from his duties in Spain, but, interest-
ingly, has allowed him to accept a position at The Hague as special consultant to
the International Criminal Court while suspended at home.3 47 (In mid-2011, he
made headlines advising that court in its prosecution of Muamamar Qaddafi
while that dictator still held power in Libya.) 34 8 The ICC appointment would
seem a poke-in-the eye to the Spanish judiciary for its prosecution of Garzon. It
exemplifies the kind of distinguished international legal support that has flowed
to Garzon since charges were brought against him.
One suspects that this case is now something of a hot potato for the
Spanish judiciary. That judiciary might be embarrassed by the chorus of re-
spected voices that has sounded international support for the judge. It might be
embarrassed by the weakness of the legal case against him, given the logic that
crimes against humanity and forced disappearances are at least arguably beyond
the reach of local amnesties-so Garzon had substantial reason to believe he
was acting legally. It might be embarrassed by the neo-Falangist roots of this
case, that is, by the extremist who initiated it. It might be embarrassed by the
light increasingly being focused on the Francoist roots of a majority of the judi-
ciary.
346 Two additional complaints, unrelated to Franco but still political, are proceeding against
Garzon. One grows out of his investigation of political and business interests connected to the
conservative Partido Popular. Another claims Garzon wrongly accepted a speaking fee (which he
donated to charity) from a bank. See Baltasar Garzon, supra note 332.
347 Raphael Minder, Spanish Judge Says His Fight for Human Rights Will Endure, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 13782113.
348 Jose Yoldia, Garzon Asesora en la Causa de la Corte Penal Internacional Contra Gadafi,
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Garzon has taken his case to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg, which has jurisdiction over violations by Spain of the European
Convention on Human Rights. In March 2011, he filed a complaint with the
ECHR that Spain's prosecution of him violated rights to an independent judici-
ary and to fair criminal procedure, as guaranteed under the European Conven-
tion. 34 9 Given the facts discussed above, which seem to strongly demonstrate
that Garzon had a reasonable legal belief that his investigation into Franco was
appropriate, given the vague and arguably inapplicable statutory language under
which he has been charged, 3 50 and given the natural protectiveness that the
Strasbourg Court shows toward fundamental rights, Garzon would seem to have
a pretty strong case.
However, one wonders whether this case is ripe for the merits. The
ECHR requires that a complaining party exhaust national remedies before it will
consider a case.351 Here, it seems that much procedure remains to be followed in
Spain. There has been no trial. There has been no final appeal to the Supreme
Court of a verdict. There has been no appeal to the Spanish Constitutional Tri-
bunal. Rare exceptions to the ECHR exhaustion requirement exist, but for ex-
traordinary circumstances, such as a truly corrupt or dysfunctional national court
system or the immediate threat of irreparable harm to the complainant if the
ECHR does not act right away. Neither appears here.
While perhaps wrongheaded and unjust, the case against Garzon pro-
vides excellent theater.352 It is a great climax to the undoing of the Pact of For-
getting, which began with Garzon himself by prosecuting Pinochet. Momentari-
ly, trapped in his own metaphor against Francoism, universal justice, will he
frustrate his foes by wielding that justice in Strasbourg or perhaps back in Ma-
drid? Or will he be Franco's last victim? 353
349 Baltasar Garz6n, supra note 332, at 1.
350 Spanish cases have seemed not to apply the charging statute to situations like Garzon's.
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 35, Nov. 4,
1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
352 On Sunday, January 29, 2012, thousands of Garzon supporters marched through the streets
of Madrid condemning his prosecution which they view as persecution. Human Rights Watch
agrees with Garzon and the marchers that crimes against humanity should not be excused by am-
nesties or statutes of limitation. Lauren Frayer, Tables Are Turned On Crusading Spanish Judge,
NPR (Jan. 30, 2012), www.npr.org/2012/01/30/146091836/tables-are-turned-on-crusading-
spanish-judge.
3 As this Article was in its final stages of editing, the Spanish Supreme Court ruled in two of
the three ongoing prosecutions against Baltazar Garzon. On February 9, 2012, it held Garzon
guilty of illegally wiretapping criminal defendants and their lawyers in a corruption investigation,
and suspended him from his law practice for 11 years. He could attack this decision in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. His supporters have protested against what they view
as persecution of Garzon for his human rights advocacy. Raphael Minder & Marlise Simons,
Prominent Rights Judge is Convicted in Spain, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/world/europe/baltasar-garzon-prominent-rights-judge-
convicted-in-spain.html. In a second decision (on February 27,2012), more pertinent to this Arti-
cle, the Supreme Court ended the prosecution against Garzon related to his attempts to investigate
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X. CONCLUSION
We end at the Valley of the Fallen-a monument whose meaning is yet
to be determined. The fascistic triumphalism and monumentalism clash with the
amnesiac policy that the Franco regime had begun to adopt by the late 1950s.
The huge mined cylinder turned to cave-basilica-mausoleum swallows you in
pre-modern monastic semi-darkness. Somber reverence, if you're a Francoist.
In addition to interring thousands of overwhelmingly nationalist sol-
diers, the basilica hosts two tombs of prominence, Franco's and that of Primo
Rivera the Younger.354 The latter founded the Spanish Falange party, much in
the spirit of his father, Spain's dictator for most of the decade preceding the
establishment of the Second Republic in April 1931.355 You reach the pairs'
tombstones after minutes walking through the tunnel-basilica, approaching the
church's altar-this after previous minutes of climbing the steps and stones of
the monument's exterior, which in turn have been preceded by a long solemn
drive through woods and up the mountain. They who conceived it all (Franco
dominant among them) presumably intended this ritual of pilgrimage with its
sacred implications.356
This "sacred" setting reveals the problem with the Valley of the Fallen.
Ardent Francoists saw the Civil War not as a civil war, but as a crusade.357 The
Crusade saved Spain from godless Bolshevism. And that vision excluded the
Republican dead from any honor the memorial was meant to display for the
dead of war.358
By executive decree on April 1, 1940 (the first anniversary of the tri-
umph of the Nationalists and the end of the Civil War), Franco ordered the con-
struction of the Valley of the Fallen. 35 9 He chose the location in the hills outside
Francoist crimes in alleged violation of the 1977 amnesty law. Associated Foreign Press, Spanish
judge Garzon acquitted in Franco-era crime probe, DAWN.COM (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.dawn.com/2012/02/27/spanish-judge-garzon-acquitted-in-franco-era-crime-
probe.html.
354 Michael Kimmelman, Ending the Silence of the Monuments in Spain, INT'L HERALD TRIB.
22, Jan. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 801610.
3 Primo Rivera the Elder had been forced out of office a bit more than a year prior to the
overwhelming vote for antimonarchist candidates in local elections in April 1931. BEEVOR, supra
note 22, at 23-25.
356 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 74. See also PRESTON, supra note 7, at 44.
3 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 77 ("[t]he war was considered to be a crusade, or a war of libera-
tion and not a civil war"); PRESTON, supra note 7, at 44 (explaining the decree establishing the
Valley of the Fallen in 1940 specifically referred to the "Crusade").
358 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 75 ("[I]t was only a question of paying homage to the nationalists
who died."); PRESTON, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that the Valley of the Fallen was originally to
be opened in 1941, but even when it opened in 1958, "considerable ... obstacles were placed in
the way of the burial of Republicans").
359 PRESTON, supra note 7, at 44.
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Madrid,36 o not far from Escorial Palace-mausoleum to generations of Spanish
monarchs. The proposed basilica was to house his tomb. 6 ' He was not subtle.
Even within the Francoist elite of the 1940s and '50s (a political spec-
trum whose borders were the right and the extreme right), some moderating
voices doubted the wisdom of a triumphalist monument.362
The espoused ideology of the regime evolved in the almost two-decade
span from conception to completion of this Francoist pantheon. Strident fascist
beliefs dominated in 1940,363 when memories of the Civil War were fresh and as
Franco's military patron Adolf Hitler conquered most of Europe with seeming
ease. By 1959, Franco had successfully remodeled his "Movement's" fagade to
not offend his new and hard-won Cold War sponsors among the western democ-
racies.364 The regime began to highlight twenty years of Spanish stability and
peace rather than the "Crusade" against godless communism. Yet, at the April 1,
1959, inauguration of the Valley of the Fallen (on the twentieth anniversary of
the Republican surrender), Franco's speech took a triumphalist and Manichean
tone with warnings of the "devils" that threatened the Spanish nation. 365
While Franco initiated these Pharoanic 366 edifices, the Catholic Church
gave them sacred sanction. The Church accepted Franco's proposal to establish
a monastery at the site. In 1960 (ironically, under the liberal papacy of John
XXIII), the Church designated the sanctuary of the Valley of the Fallen as a
"basilica." True, some moderates within the Catholic hierarchy urged a more
inclusive slant to the project so that all war dead, including Republicans, would
be memorialized. However, the failure to honor equally all Spanish victims ul-
timately did not deter official Church support.367
Thousands of Spaniards labored to carve the stone mountain into the
overbearing monuments and cave-basilica that comprise the Valley of the Fall-
en. These workers included a large proportion of Republican political prison-
ers 368-some say slave labor.3 69 The masters of the project required many to
360 Id.
361 Id. at 43.
362 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 78-80.
363 PRESTON, supra note 7, at 27-29 (explaining that immediately following the Civil War,
Spanish government had distinct fascist characteristics); Cf JAVIER TUSSELL, SPAIN: FROM
DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: 1939 TO THE PRESENT 34-58 (Rosemary Clark trans., Blackwell
Publishing 2007) (arguing that fascism never fully took hold in post-Civil War Spain).
36 Kimmelman, supra note 354 (arguing that Franco intended the Valley of the Fallen to serve
as the basis for reconciliation).
365 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 83.
366 Id. at 74.
367 There is some evidence that some prelates expressed concern over entanglement of the
Church in such a divisive partisan project, but ultimately the Church gave its sanction, as dis-
cussed in the text. AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 80 n.64.
3 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 75-76 (explaining that although all parties agree that prisoners
labored on the Valley of the Fallen, dispute remains as to number); PRESTON, supra note 7, at 43.
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work in hazardous conditions. Their accommodations often approximated con-
centration camps.370 Many laborers died. Accidents killed some, mistreatment
others, silicosis others still.371
As Spain passed through a decade of hesitant Proto-transition in the
1960s and full democratic transition in the 1970s, the Valley of the Fallen con-
tinued to stand, unreconstructed, as a symbol of victory for half the nation and
of defeat for the other half. Ironically, its continued existence as a concrete bad
memory was assured by the very Pact of Forgetting that suppressed national
memory in general.372 The grand compromise that allowed the amnesiac demo-
cratic transition to proceed from 1975 through 1995 shielded the edifice, as well
as lesser Francoist symbols.
Today, Spaniards debate the future of the massive complex. It continues
to be maintained at substantial public expense as a national monument. Right-
wingers see no harm in honoring the leaders and soldiers in Catholic Spain's
struggle against godless and foreign communism.3 73 The left is divided, with
some arguing for destruction of the monuments and basilica, the fate met by
Hitler's and Mussolini's major architectural expressions of fascist domina-
tion.374 Other progressives believe preservation of the Valley of the Fallen, as
evidence of the evil of Francoism, appropriately supports the national reawaken-
ing of memory. Many in the middle would see the site maintained, but truly
transformed into a monument remembering all the victims of Spain's twentieth
century tragedy and a symbol of reconciliation. (One would assume such a heal-
ing vision could not be achieved with Franco and Primo Rivera retaining their
tombs of visible prominence.)
The Recovery of Historical Memory Law of 2007 prohibits the sort of
Francoist and Falangist demonstrations that have occurred at the monument for
decades.
The official English-language guidebook for the Valley of the Fallen is
weirdly silent on the major issues surrounding the monument: forced labor
369 While some writers refer to the group as including Republican "prisoners of war" as well as
"political prisoners," such designation draws a false distinction. International law requires states to
release prisoners of war after hostilities have ended. Therefore, any person detained significantly
beyond April 1, 1939, solely for his service in the armed forces of the Republican government or
its allies, would seem to be a political prisoner.
370 AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 77 (explaining that conditions resembled those of concentration
camps, however, some prisoners were allowed to bring their families to the work site).
3 Id.
372 Kimmelman, supra note 354.
373 Id.
374 Id. (explaining that Zapatero's government passed a law requiring Spanish provinces to
remove monuments to Franco).
37s Ley de Memoria Hist6rica [Law of Historical Memory] (B.O.E. 2007, 310) (Spain). See
also Kimmelman, supra note 354 (arguing that the Law of Historical Memory's ban on political
rallies likely intended to prevent celebrations of Franco and Primo de Rivera's deaths).
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376deaths, its fascist triumphalism, its continued existence. Rather the guidebook
focuses on geography, architecture, and (sanitized) construction history. My
living guide, a local man in late middle age, said nothing of the controversial
issues during my tour. However, when I questioned him about forced labor
deaths, he agreed that thousands probably had died this way. The tour then con-
tinued through the Valley of the Fallen, and if the guide had any more unofficial
memories he kept them to himself.
376 Kimmelman, supra note 354. See also AGUILAR, supra note 2, at 85 n.68.
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